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Unconscionability: A Matter of Conscience
for California Consumers
By CHALRES H. HuRD* AND PmLIP L. BUSH**
ALONE among the major commercial states, California has no
statutory doctrine of unconscionability by which courts can police
contracts involving sales of goods, as that term is defined in the Uni-
form Commercial Code.' Only one other jurisdiction in the country,
has not adopted section 2-3021 of the Uniform Commercial Code
* A.B., 1967, Umversity of Southern California; S.D., 1971, Umversity of Call-
formia, Berkeley; Member, California Bar.
** Member, Third Year Class.
1. "In this [article,], unless the context otherwise requires 'contract' and 'agree-
ment' are limited to those relating to the present or future sale of goods. 'Contract
for sale' includes both a present sale of goods and a contract to sell goods at a future
time. A 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price
.... " CAL. Comm. CODE § 2106(1) (West 1964).
'Goods' means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money
in which the price is to be paid, investment securities ... and things in action. Id.
§ 2105(1).
2. Louisiana has not adopted any provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.
All other states, plus the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands, have passed
Uniform Commercial Code section 2-302 without change. 1 UNwo I.Aws ANN.,
UNnOR COMRCLI. CODE § 2-302 (1968).
3. UmFoi m ComiamsciAL CODE § 2-302 provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity
to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court
in making the determination.
An excellent description and appraisal of the drafting history is found in Leff,
Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. RaV.
485, 489-501, 509-16 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Left]. Leff's caustic criticism of
the provision is, undoubtedly, the most important piece of writing on the topic. How-
ever, his condemnation of section 2-302 has not been accepted by other writers, even
which empowers courts to deny enforcement of unconscionable con-
tracts or terms. In 1963, the California legislature adopted its version
of the Uniform Commercial Code, but refused to approve section 2-
302' and thus intentionally left a gap in the statutory scheme regarding
unconscionability However, the need for such legislation m the area
of consumer law persists. The judicial or legislative adoption of the
doctrine of unconscionability would constitute a significant step m es-
tablishing adequate legal remedies for consumers. This need has been
recognized by the introduction of Senate Bill No. 3 on January 3,
1972. 5 The bill is a comprehensive code which consolidates existing
consumer law and proposes important new remedies. One section
of the proposed code, section 5108, 6 establishes a statutory doctrine
those who regard his analysis as indispensable. See, e.g., Ellinghaus, In Defense of
Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Ellinghaus]; Spanogle,
Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 931 (1969).
4. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2302, California Code Comment 1 (West 1964).
5. California Senate Bill No. 3, introduced Jan. 3, 1972, as amended, July 27,
1972 [hereinafter cited as S.B. 3]. The bill was not passed in 1972 and was introduced
again in substantially similar form on January 8, 1973. S.B. 3 (1973) California
Senate Bill No. 3, introduced Jan. 8, 1973, as amended, Feb. 8, 1973.
6. S.B. 3, supra note 5, at § 5108 provides:
(a) If the court, as a matter of law, finds that a consumer transaction, any aspect
of the transaction, any conduct directed against the consumer by a party to the trans-
action, or any result of the transaction is unconscionable, the court shall, in addition
to any other remedies available to the consumer under this, or any other act or rule
of law, either refuse to enforce the transaction against the consumer, or so limit
the application of any unconscionable aspect or conduct so as to avoid any unconscion-
able result.
(c) Without limiting the scope of subdivision (a), the court shall consider,
among other things, all the following as pertinent to the issue of unconscionability"
(1) The degree to which the practice unfairly takes advantage of the lack
of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity of consumers.
(2) Knowledge by those engaging in the practice of the inability of con-
sumers to receive benefits properly anticipated from the goods or services involved.
(3) Gross disparity between the price of goods or services and their value as
measured by the price at which similar goods or services are readily obtainable by
other consumers, or by other tests of true value.
(4) The fact that the practice may enable merchants to take advantage of the
inability of consumers reasonably to protect their interests by reason of physical
or mental infirmities, illiteracy or inability to understand the language of the agree-
ment, ignorance or lack of education or similar factors.
(5) The degree to which terms of the transaction require consumers to waive
legal rights.
(6) The degree to which terms of the transaction require consumers to
jeopardize money or property beyond the money or property immediately at issue
in the transaction.
(7) The degree to which the natural effect of the practice is to cause or aid
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of unconscionability which applies solely to consumer transactions. 7
This section was considerably altered by an amendment of February
26, 1973,8 but this article supports the adoption of the July 27, 1972,
version of section 5108.1
The first part of section 510810 is similar to section 2-302(1)
of the Uniform Commercial Code. It provides that if a court finds
as a matter of law that a consumer transaction or any part thereof
is unconscionable, it shall refuse to enforce the transaction against
the consumer or it may limit the terms of the transaction so as to
avoid any unconscionable result. It is important to note that a finding
of unconscionability is made as a matter of law and supports a broad
in causing consumers to misunderstand the true nature of the transaction or their
rights and duties thereunder.
(8) The extent or degree to which the writing purporting to evidence the ob-
ligation of the consumer in the transaction contains terms or provisions or authorizes
practices prohibited by law.
(9) Definitions of unconscionability m statutes, regulations, rulings and de-
cisions of legislative, administrative, or judicial bodies in this state or elsewhere.
(d) In addition to the protection afforded m subdivision (a), the consumer shall
be entitled upon a finding of unconscionability to recover from the creditor or person
responsible for the unconscionable conduct reasonable attorney's fees. Reasonable at-
torney's fees shall be determined by the value of the time reasonably expended by
the attorney and not by the amount of the recovery on behalf of the debtor.
7. "'Consumer' means an individual who seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease,
any goods or services for personal, family, or household purposes.' Id. § 12122(d).
"'Transaction' means an agreement between a consumer and any other person, whether
or not the agreement is a contract enforceable by action, and includes the making
of, and the performance pursuant to, the agreement." Id. § 12122(e).
8. California Senate Bill No. 3, § 5108, introduced Jan. 8, 1973, as amended
Feb. 26, 1973 provides:
(a) With respect to a consumer credit sale, consumer lease, or consumer loan,
if the court as a matter of law finds that:
(1) The agreement to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, or to
have been induced by unconsiconable conduct, the court may refuse to enforce the
agreement.
(2) Any part of the agreement to have been unconsiconable at the time it was
made, the court may refuse to enforce the agreement, or it may enforce the re-
mainder of the agreement without the unconscionable term or part, or it may
so limit the application of any unconscionable term or part as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
(b) If it is claimed or appears to the court that the agreement or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable, the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity
to present evidence as to its setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making
the determination.
(c) For the purpose of this section, a charge or practice expressly permitted by
this division is not in itself unconscionable.
9. See text of S.B. 3, § 5108, contained in note 6 supra.
10. Id., § 5108(a).
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range of judicial relief. Such relief may include nonenforcement of
an unconscionable contract term or, in appropriate cases, restitution
based on rescission." The proposed statute then lists in nine subdivi-
sions various factors which the court shall consider as relevant to the issue
of unconscionability 12 The purpose of tlus list is twofold. First,
it serves as a collecting place of existing doctrines 3 and specifically
directs attention to the applicability of these doctrines to issues of un-
conscionability in consumer transactions. Second, it encourages courts
to look to specific factors in determining whether a transaction is un-
conscionable and to articulate fully the factual basis for any such find-
ing. Section 5108 also provides that upon a finding of unconscionabil-
ity, the consumer shall be entitled to attorney's fees based on the
value of time reasonably expended in bringing or defending an ac-
tion.1 4
One important part of the doctrine of unconscionability that is
appropriately omitted from the proposed statute is the test that is to
be used by a court when it weighs the various factors listed in the
nine subdivisions. The process of balancing the interests of sellers
and consumers is most suitably developed by the courts on a case
by case basis. This article proposes the following basic test by means
of which a court may reach an articulated, equitable result when
faced with an allegedly unconscionable transaction. A finding of un-
conscionability should be based on a preliminary consideration of the
rune factors listed in section 5108 and a subsequent determination
that the contract terms or sales practices bear no reasonable relation
to the business risks assumed by the seller nor to the benefits he con-
fers.Ir
It should be noted initially that the term unconscionable is not
new to the law of western nations. While Roman and Civil law
did not include this term, the legal systems of France, Germany,
11. Id. The language "refuse to enforce the transaction [and] limit the application
of any unconscionable aspect so as to avoid any unconscionable result" should
be construed to include at least restitutionary relief. No view is expressed here regard-
ing the recovery of actual damages based solely upon a finding of unconscionability.
12. S.B. 3, § 5108(c)(1)-(9), supra note 5. See text of S.B. 3, § 5108, con-
tained in note 6 supra.
13. Compare S.B. 3, § 5108(c)(1), (4), supra note 5 with CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1575 (West 1954) (undue influence). Compare S.B. 3, § 5108(c)(2), (7), supra
note 5 with CAL. CIv. CODE § 1572 (West 1954) (actual fraud). Cf. CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 1750-84 (West 1973) (Consumers Legal Remedies Act).
14. S.B. 3, § 5108(d), supra note 5. See text of S.B. 3, § 5108, contained
in note 6 supra.
15. See text accompanying notes 252-272 infra.
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and the United States "react adversely to any contract that is overreach-
ing, oppressive or so unfair as to shock the courts' consciences." 16
Certain types of contracts such as labor agreements and insurance
contracts receive close scrutiny because of the possibility of abuse by
one party. 1 Moreover, equity has long denied enforcement of uncon-
scionable bargains. 18 In the United States, the passage of section 2-
302 in all but two of the states' 9 is further evidence that the doctrine
of unconscionability is justifiably considered a useful tool with which
courts may police the making of contracts involving sales of goods.
In spite of the historical and contemporary support for the doc-
trine, the California legislature in 1963 rejected section 2-302 of the
Uniform Commercial Code on the grounds that unconscionability vio-
lated freedom of contract,20 was too vague,2  and was already suffi-
ciently developed in California law.22 These reasons are invalid, and
the following points developed in this article indicate the need for
an explicit judicial or legislative adoption of the doctrine of uncon-
scionability.
The first part of the article discusses the nature of the consumer
16. Squillante, Unconsconability: French, German, Anglo-American Application,
34 AuiANY L. Rnv. 297, 298 (1970).
17. Id.
18. See 4 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1405(a) (5th ed. 1941); 11 S.
WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1425 (3d ed. W Jaeger 1968).
19. See note 2 supra.
20. 'The final recommendation of the Advisory Committee and the decision to
delete this section was based upon the belief that giving courts unqualified power
to strike down terms they might consider 'unconscionable' could result lm the renegotia-
tion of contracts m every case of disagreement with the fairness of provisions the
parties had accepted. Cal. State Bar Comm. on the Commercial Code, A Special
Report, the Uniform Commercial Code, 37 CAL. ST. B.J. 117, 135-36 (1962), quoted
in CAL. COMM. CODE § 2302, California Code Comment 1 (West 1964). See H.
MARSH JR. & W WARREN, REPORT ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO Ta UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE, SENATE FACT FINDING COMMrEE ON JUDICIARY, SIXTH PROGRESS RE-
PORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, PART 1-THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, ch. VII, 436,
455-57 (1961).
21. STATE BAR CoMM. ON THE COMMERCIAL CODE, ANALYSIS AND INTERIM RE-
PORT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, FINAL REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITIEE ON
CHAPTER 2 (SALES) OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, SENATE FACT FINDING
COMM. ON JUDICIARY, SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, PART 1-THm UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE, ch. V, 316, 341 (1961). The California Bankers Associa-
tion objected that the word "unconscionable" is not a "legal word of art." COMM.
ON TIHE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, THE CAL. BANKERS ASS'N, RECOMMENDATIONS
AND COMMENTS OF THE CAL. BANKERS Ass'N, SENATE FACT FINNG COMm. ON JUI-
CIARY, SIXra PROGRESS REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, PART 1-THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE, ch. V, 402, 403 (1960).
22. H. MARSH JR. & W. WARREN, REPORT ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
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market and the doctrinal basis of the laws which govern this market. 3
It will show that the consumer market is characterized by relative in-
equality of bargaining position between sellers and buyers. Because
of this disparity in bargaining power, consumer transactions are espe-
cially subject to abuse. The public nature of consumer problems war-
rants further legislative and judicial efforts toward affording more ade-
quate protection for consumers. Existing law is not sufficiently sensi-
tive to detect and remedy abuses of bargaining power.
The doctrinal basis of the contract and commercial law which
governs the sale of goods and services rests on an historical commit-
ment to freedom of contract. The freedom of contract doctrine oper-
ates on the assumption that contracting parties are of nearly equal
bargaining power and should have the utmost liberty to make enforce-
able agreements. The rules of law derived from this model are thus
biased in such a way as to preclude adequate recognition of the prob-
lems of unequal bargaining power because these rules assume a priori
that such inequality does not exist. If a model is not truly descriptive
of the conditions it purports to govern, the law derived from this model
cannot operate equitably
The second part of the article describes the extent to which Cali-
fornia statutes and case law impose some limitations on the liberty
of sellers to contract.2 4  The following doctrines have been applied
generally to all types of contracts and are particularly relevant to situa-
tions involving unequal bargaining power: interpretation of contract
terms to avoid harsh results,25 undue influence, 26 duress,27 fraud,2"
and the adhesion contracts doctrine. 9 Recently enacted statutes appli-
cable only to consumer transactions will also be discussed: the Con-
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, SENATE FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, SIXTH
PROGRESS REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, PART I-THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, ch.
VII, 436, 455-57 This report is quoted in part in CAL. COMM. CODE § 2302, California
Code Comment 1 (West 1964). California courts have tended to void contracts which
were termed "unconscionable." See Stevens v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862,
879, 377 P.2d 284, 295, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 183 (1962); Jacklich v. Baer, 57 Cal.
App. 2d 684, 693, 135 P.2d 179, 184 (1943); State Fin. Co. v. Smith, 44 Cal. App.
2d 688, 693, 112 P.2d 901, 904 (1941).
23. See text accompanying notes 36-63 infra.
24. See text accompanying notes 64-251 mira.
25. See text accompanying notes 86-94 infra.
26. See text accompanying notes 95-109 infra.
27. See text accompanying notes 110-146 znfra.
28. See text accompanying notes 147-181 mifra.
29. See text accompanying notes 182-201 infra.
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sumers Legal Remedies Act, 0 the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty
Act,"' and the Unruh Act.2 A close examination of these limitations
discloses gaps which may be appropriately filled by a standard of un-
conscionability.
The third section discusses the standard of unconscionability and
illustrates its utility as a test for detecting abuse of bargaining power. 3
One function of the proposed section 5108 is to serve as an important
collecting place for doctrines relevant to consumer transactions. The
law allowing consumers to void unenforceable contracts is so diffuse
and ambiguous that legitimate consumer actions are discouraged. Sec-
tion 5108 pulls together the relevant existing rules, adds some new
ones, and establishes a clear-cut but flexible standard applicable to
all consumer sales. The main purpose of the standard of unconscion-
ability which underlies section 5108 is to serve as an important residual
category 4 which covers those fact situations which defy classification
within narrowly defined areas of law. The basic test advocated here
is whether the contract terms or sales practices bear a reasonable rela-
tion to the risks assumed by the seller and to the benefits he confers- 5
The Problem: Lack of Adequate Judicial
Scrutiny of Consumer Transactions
Protection of unwary consumers from being duped by unscru-
pulous sellers is an exigency of the utmost priority m contemporary
society.38
This statement from a recent California Supreme Court opinion
is indicative of a widespread belief that consumer transactions are espe-
cially subject to abuse and require more adequate legal scrutiny. The
validity of this belief may be illustrated by an examination of the nature
of the consumer market and the doctrinal bases of the law which
have been developed to govern the interactions in this market.
30. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1750-84 (West 1973), as amended, CAL. CMv. CODE §§
1750-84 (West Supp. 1973). See text accompanying notes 208-212 znfra.
31. CAL. Civ. CoDB §§ 1790-95.5 (West 1973), as amended, CAL. CIrv. CODE
§§ 1790-95.5 (West Supp. 1973). See text accompanying notes 213-238 infra.
32. CAL. Cirv. CoDE §§ 1801-12.10 (West 1973). See text accompanying notes
239-251 infra.
33. See text accompanying notes 252-299 infra.
34. Ellinghaus, supra note 3, at 759. See text accompanying note 293-301 infra.
35. See text accompanying notes 254-299 inra.
36. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 808, 484 P.2d 964, 968, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 796, 800 (1971).
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Nature of the Consumer Market
Three basic characteristics of the consumer market are relevant
to the idea that more effective protection is needed for consumers.
Initially, the problems encountered by consumers are properly consid-
ered public problems and not merely isolated incidents causing only
individual loss. Secondly, the consumer market is characterized by
relative inequality of bargaining position between, buyer and seller.
Finally, the nature of the market gives rise to a high potential for
abuse which is not adequately recognized by existing California law
Everyone who lives in our society has extensive direct experience
with this market and depends upon it for the supply of goods and
services. An individual can maximize his standard of living only when
he can obtain benefits from goods and services commensurate with
the value of the time and money he spends on his purchases. The
aggregate material welfare of society thus depends largely on the abil-
ity of the market to facilitate the fair exchange of money for goods
and services. The public welfare is diminished to the extent that
dysfunctional factors such as fraudulent and unconscionable business
practices prevent this fair exchange of resources. In dealing with an
individual case of fraud, it is easy to take a microcosmic perspective
of the problems involved in a single transaction. On the other hand,
a broader perspective is necessary in order to evaluate whether im-
provements in the legal system might facilitate the recognized goal
of fair and efficient exchange of goods and services. This broad per-
spective recognizes that consumer problems are public problems.
The second principal characteristic of the consumer market is
the relative inequality of bargaining position between buyer and
seller. 37 Generally speaking, the first determinant of bargaining posi-
tion is knowledge of the subject matter and of the dynamics of negotia-
tion. The second determinant is one's resources. principally money
Inequality of bargaining position exists when one party substantially
lacks one or both of the determinants, knowledge or power.
Knowledge of the subject matter of a sale requires awareness
of enough facts about a product or service on which to base a decision
as to the relative benefits and costs of a given purchase. Every con-
sumer wants to get his money's worth, but this result requires an ability
to judge objectively the merits of what the seller offers. Our society
has reached such a level of technological sophistication that most prod-
37. See L. VoLD, LAW OF SALES 447 (2d ed. 1959).
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ucts on the American market are sufficiently complex to prevent ade-
quate factual knowledge on the part of the average consumer. Rela-
tively few people have any information about automobiles, television
sets, radios, household appliances, and other devices that would enable
them to evaluate objectively any given product.
It may be argued that if a consumer knows that a car gets eighteen
miles per gallon, seats four, and will last one hundred thousand
miles, he doesn't need any information about engine specifications,
brake horsepower, or other technical data. But what is significant
is that the typical buyer obtains the relevant information (for example,
that the car might last one hundred thousand miles) only on the basis
of representations made by the seller or manufacturer and not on the
basis of any independently acquired information. This lack of inde-
pendent information is an important aspect of inequality of bargaining
position. Perhaps the most significant result of this disparity m knowl-
edge is that the consumer is forced into a position of total reliance
on the seller to disclose information about the subject matter of the
transaction.
A second aspect of unequal bargaining position based on dis-
parity in knowledge is the consumer's lack of ability and opportunity
to negotiate. It is doubtful that a significant number of consumers
in our society have any ability to bargain with a seller in the sense
of threatening to withhold resources (money) to obtain a lower price
or more quality in a product. But even if buyers had this ability,
there would not be any opportunity to use it in a meaningful way.
Our economy is oriented toward a highly efficient distribution of
large quantities of goods. It is consonant with this goal of distribution
to set prices m a store and not permit any time-wasting price haggling
or other negotiations. The buyer is forced to take it or leave it and
to rely on purported competition among sellers to keep prices and
values commensurate.
The predominance of form-pad contracts38 in credit transactions
38. The phrase "form pad contract" was coined by Professor Karl Llewellyn:
"[When contracts are produced by the printing press, with the fountain pen used
not for recording thought but for authentication, the adequacy of the general law for
filling gaps in the conscious bargain is flatly negatived, m the view of the party prepar-
ing and ordering the form pads." Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HAv. L. REv. 700,
701 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Llewellyn]. Of course, there are many advantages
of standardized contracts: they save time and trouble in bargaining; they make sales
administration simpler and more efficient; they allow concentration of decision-making
in the most capable and trusted persons, such as managers and contract draftsmen,
rather than salesmen. Furthermore, savings from this specialization may be passed
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also operates to eliminate the opportunity to bargain while facilitating
the goal of efficient distribution. The buyer is given the restrictive
alternatives of signing the contract as printed or not completing the
sale. The use of legal terminology in credit and other contract situa-
tions makes it difficult for the average (and especially the relatively
uneducated) consumer to understand what he is surrendering. Fur-
thermore, the complexity of contracts often discourages people from
reading them;39 instead they depend on oral representations40 of sales-
men. Thus, the nature of the consumer market is such that the oppor-
tunity to negotiate is severely restricted because of lack of knowledge,
and inequality of bargaining position is thereby reinforced.
Inadequate knowledge is aggravated among the poor, whose ex-
perience with goods and contract terms is restricted to those available
in a limited geographic area. The relevant market4' of the poor is
narrowed by an inability to shop around either because they do not
know how or are unable to do so due to lack of transportation. This
gives a neighborhood merchant a veritable monopoly in supplying the
needs of the poor.
This inability of the poor to do comparative shopping is a man-
ifestation of a general tendency among all consumers to avoid compar-
ative shopping.42  The failure to obtain and understand facts about
products and the lack of opportunity to negotiate would be of less
significance if consumers compared offers among competing sellers.
A comparison of terms of various sellers is essential to an economically
on to the consumer. Id.
A "form-pad contract" is often an adhesion contract as well. One of the early
uses of the term contract of adhesion was in R. SALEILLES, DE LA D)kCLARATION
DE VOLONT § 89, at 229 (1901). The phrase was introduced into American law
by Edwin W Patterson as an appropriate description of an insurance contract. Patter-
son, THE DELIVERY OF A LIFE-INSURANCE POLIcY, 33 HARv. L. RFv. 198, 222 (1919).
Patterson translated Saleilles' definition of contrat de l'adhesion as "a contract] in
which a single will is exclusively predominant, acting as a unilateral will which dic-
tates its law, no longer to an individual, but to an indeterminate collectivity, and which
in advance undertakes unilaterally, subject to the adhesion of those who would wish
to accept the law [loil of the contract and to take advantage of the engagements
imposed on themselves." Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts,
64 COLUM. L. REv. 833, 856 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Patterson].
39 See Mellinkioff, How to Make Contracts illegible, 5 STAN. L. REv. 418
(1953). The author points out that it is easy to obfuscate important terms, merely
by the way a form is printed.
40. It is ironic that this dependence on salesmen's representations is precisely
what the advent of standardized contracts was designed to avoid. See note 38 supra.
41. See Leff, supra note 3, at 553-55.
42. P KEETON & M. SHAPo, PRODUCTS AND THE CONSUMER: DECEPTIVE PRAC-
TICES 223 (1972).
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rational decision based on articulated factors of benefits and costs.
Unless a buyer knows whether and where he can get a better deal,
he has no real bargaining knowledge at all.
The bargaining position of the poor and a large segment of other
consumers is also weakened by a need for compensatory consump-
tion,43 that is, consumption of material goods which ostensibly com-
pensates for lack of social position. This need is illustrative of the
various noneconomic motivations" which influence decisions to pur-
chase. Other motivations of this type include the need to purchase
to relieve boredom or to give expression to a generalized obsession
with material objects.
Noneconomic motivations weaken bargaining position because
they inhibit demand for products based on economically rational deci-
sions which weigh specific benefits and costs. Decisions which reflect
such motivations as compensatory consumption are especially subject
to control by advertising media, selling tactics, and other forms of con-
ditionnig. This control flows from the seller's superior bargaining
position and expands the potential for harsh and unconscionable terms.
The significance of these facts is not to argue against superior
bargaining power, advertising, or frivolous buying habits. The point
is that, as a general rule, consumers have neither the knowledge, moti-
vation, nor opportunity to bargain in the sense of assessing the value
of a product, comparing offers among competing sellers, or threaten-
ing to withhold payment unless the seller offers adequate consideration.
Because the consumer has little or no knowledge of the subject matter
and of the dynamics of negotiation, the seller is able to impose terms
which often result in unjustifiable abuse.
The second determinant of bargaining position is one's fund of
resources. A brief examination of the distribution of wealth in the
United States indicates that the average purchaser of consumer goods
has few resources in terms of money. It was a popular belief in the
1960's that "'the American income pyramid is becoming less un-
equal,' ," but an examination of relevant statistics shows an obvious
43. D. CAPLOVrrz, Tim POOR PAY MORE 13 n.1 (1965). The phrase compen-
satory consumption was coined by Robert K. Merton and developed by David Caplo-
vitz: "Appliance, automobile and the dream of a home of their own can become
compensations for blocked social mobility." Id. at 13.
44. This term is found m Bauer, Limits of Persuasion, in UNDERsTANDING CON-
SUMER BEHAVIOR 39, 43-44 (1966).
45. H. MLLER, INCOME DisTrmBuToN IN Thm UNmTED STATES 2 (1966) (quoting
Paul A. Samuelson).
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pattern of substantial inequality in the distribution of wealth and no
appreciable change in this pattern since 1929 46
Highly significant in the consumer credit context is the fact that,
in 1964, 40 percent of all American families were in debt or had
savings of less than one hundred dollars.4 7  Twenty percent of all
families owned no assets, and 48 percent owned less than five hundred
dollars worth of belongings.4 8 A report in 1967 indicated that in that
year more than 60 percent of American families were making pay-
ments on installment loans or installment purchases. 49  From 1945
to 1967, installment credit grew from 2.5 billion dollars to over 80
billion dollars. 0 There is no evidence that this pattern of debt and
inequality of wealth has changed since 1967
These examples point out that wealth is so unevenly distributed
that the individual consumer has no real bargaining power in terms
of money He often needs what the seller offers, can get no better
terms elsewhere, and has only a limited amount to spend. To the
average buyer, every penny counts. But for the seller, it is usually
not significant whether one particular consumer buys or not. The
seller can dictate his terms because it is only the aggregate behavior
of buyers that will affect him. This aggregate behavior is not oriented
in any coordinated manner toward bargaining with the seller, and the
merchant is in an excellent position to maintain his superior position.
He can often control, via advertising and other sales practices, the
wants of the consumers whose demands purportedly regulate his eco-
nomic behavior.
The third characteristic of the consumer market, the high poten-
tial for abuse, is largely a result of the relative inequality of bargaining
positions. A situation is ripe for abuse whenever the seller, because
of his superior position, is able to dictate terms of sale (including
price) which do not bear a reasonable relation to the business risks
46. Id. at 2-3. "[I]n 1960 the top ten percent [of the population] controlled
two-thirds of all liquid assets, while fifty-one percent of the spending units headed
by unskilled or service workers had no assets. Other, more shocking, data suggest
that between .2 and .3 of one percent of the population control twenty-two percent
of the personal wealth and sixty to seventy percent of all privately held corporate
wealth."
47 Parker, The Myth of Middle America, THE CENTER MAGAZINE, March, 1970,
at 68.
48. Id.
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undertaken in the performance of the seller's obligations.5 1 This abuse
usually manifests itself in the form of disparity between the price paid
and the fair market value of the product.52 Abuse may also result
in cases where the seller knows that the consumer will not be able
to derive benefits properly anticipated from the goods or services. 53
Other cases include the imposition of conditions favorable to the seller
at the expense of the normal legal rights and expectations of the con-
sumer.
5 4
Existing Law Based on the Freedom of Contract Doctrine
The consumer market is characterized by inequality of bargaining
power between buyer and seller, and by a high potential for abuse
of legitimate expectations and rights of the purchasing public. But
the rules of law which govern market interaction are biased in such
a way as to preclude adequate recognition of the problems of unequal
bargaining power. In California, the Uniform Commercial Code and
certain sections of the Civil Code provide the legal rules relating to
the sale of goods. The doctrine of freedom of contract is the basic
policy underlying these statutes.55
Generally speaking, freedom of contract means freedom to make
agreements which are enforceable at law.56 In the classical statement
of the freedom of contract doctrine, every person is presumed to have
the inherent ability to order his own economic affairs and to make
his own informed decisions to buy and sell.57  Therefore, the law
should allow the adjustive mechanism of the market, based on individ-
ual demands, to determine the allocation of values and risks in eco-
51. See text accompanying notes 264-279 infra.
52. See S.B. 3, § 5108(c) (3), supra note 5. See text of S.B. 3, § 5108, con-
tamed m note 6 supra.
53. See S.B. 3, § 5108(c)(2), supra note 5. See text of S.B. 3, § 5108, con-
tamed in note 6 supra.
54. See. S.B. 3, § 5108(c)(5), supra note 5. See text of S.B. 3, § 5108, con-
tained m note 6 supra.
55. "[Cal. Comm. Code § 1102(3) (West 1964)] states affirmatively that
freedom of contract is a principle of the Code ." CAL. COMM. CODE § 1102,
Uniform Commercial Code Comment 2 (West 1964).
56. Bunn, Freedom of Contract Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 59 (1960).
57. "[flf there is one thing which more than another pubblic policy requires it is
that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of con-
tracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be
enforced by Courts of justice." Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson,
L.R. 19 Eq. 462, 465 (1875).
nomic transactions. 58  This free-bargaining model assumes that parties
have approximately equal knowledge of the specifics of a proposed
bargain and nearly equal power relationships. 59 From these assump-
tions, the basic rules of contract law find their logical justification.
Contract law has developed as a response to the need to enforce
legitimate business expectations.60  As such, courts have adhered to
rules which treat objective manifestations of consent as binding6 and
which preclude a judicial evaluation of the adequacy of consideration. 2
While there are specific instances in which a court must declare a
contract void or voidable, the general policy underlying the enforceabil-
ity of agreements favors the maximum amount of liberty to contract
and a very narrow construction of rules which render a contract void-
able. It is contended here that in consumer transactions, market con-
ditions are such as to warrant a broader construction of rules which
might allow a consumer to void unconscionable contracts.
The doctrine of freedom of contract and the derivative rules of
contract law represent a model of the market justified by nineteenth
century arguments of moral and economic individualism.6 Rather
58. See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 COLuM. L. Rnv. 629, 640-41 (1943) [hereinafter cited as Kessler]. In a
free bargaining model, freedom of contract appears to function well because each party
can withhold what he has and the other party wants. See Hale, Bargaining, Duress,
and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. RE-v. 603 (1943) [hereinafter cited as Hale].
59 See Wilson, Freedom of Contract and Adhesion Contracts, 14 INT'L & CoMI'.
L.Q. 172, 174 (1965). See generally Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454
(1909) [hereinafter cited as Pound].
The response might readily be made that power has never been distributed such
that parties could contract on an equal footing in most transactions. However, the
modem alignment of economic power is commonly recognized to be much more mono-
polized now than at prior times in history. The fact that power is held by only
a few lessens the ability of the individual to refuse to deal with any one supplier
of needed or desired goods. Professor Friedrich Kessler, in a pioneering article on
the need to adjust contract theory to ensure free bargaining in an economy character-
ized by standardized contracts, maintained that free bargaining has diminished because
of the "innate trend of competitive capitalism towards monopoly." Kessler, supra note
58, at 640.
Adoption of uniform contract terms by industrywide trade organizations further
reduces the individual's power to bargain effectively. See Hennmgsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (entire automobile industry used the
same standardized contract). Henningsen illustrates the total lack of competition over,
for example, warranty clauses.
60. A. CoRBIN., CoRanr ON CONTRACTS § 1, at 2 (One Volume Ed. 1952).
61. E.g., Brant v. Califorma Dames, Inc., 4 Cal. 2d 128, 133, 48 P.2d 13, 16
(1935).
62. See, e.g., Rice v. Brown, 120 Cal. App. 2d 578, 582, 261 P.2d 565, 567
(1953).
63. Kessler, supra note 58, at 640.
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than an empirical description of how the bargaining process actually
works, the doctrine is an intellectual construct, using certain norms
drawn from theories about how the bargaining process should work.
Nevertheless, the freedom of contract model is used to judge the acts
of specific parties in real contract situations without regard to the fact
that these situations may not fulfill the theoretical requirements of
the model. If a model is not truly descriptive of the conditions it
purports to govern, the law derived from this model cannot possibly
operate equitably This law will fail to detect and remedy abuses
when they occur. Because of the assumptions of equal bargaining
power underlying contract law, legitimate business expectations are
enforced, but legitimate consumer expectations are not. The prob-
lem which the doctrine of unconscionability is designed to minimize
thus arises from two factors. On the one hand, a complex consumer
market is characterized by a high potential for abuse due to inequality
of bargaining power. On the other hand, the law governing sales of
goods is derived from a freedom of contract model which assumes a
prion that this characteristic of abuse does not exist.
California Limits on Freedom to Contract
California statutory and case law have established certain limita-
tions on the rights of parties to create enforceable agreements. It
is generally recognized that freedom to contract is not absolute. But
the recognition of this concept of limited freedom does not make any
easier those basic policy decisions which establish the extent to which
the freedom will be restricted.
The right to legal enforcement of a contract is curtailed by statute
whenever the consent of a party is not free or real,64 and is obtained
through duress, menace, fraud, undue influence, or mistake. 65 A con-
tract thus formed is voidable and may be rescinded by the party whose
consent was wrongfully obtained. 66 A contract is void to the extent
that the object of the agreement is unlawful.6 7 An enforceable con-
tract also requires parties capable of contracting and sufficient consid-
eration.68 The element of consent in consumer transactions is the
most relevant of all these factors since abuse due to unequal bargaining
64. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1566 (West 1954).
65. Id. § 1567.
66. Id. § 1689(b)(1) (West 1973).
67. Id. § 1598-99 (West 1954).
68. Id. § 1550(1), (4).
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power occurs even though there exist competent parties, a lawful
object, and sufficient consideration.
Two judicially developed techniques relevant to consent in a con-
sumer setting supplement the statutory list. One technique is the inter-
pretation of contracts to avoid enforcement of harsh bargains. 69 The
second method is the doctrine of adhesion contracts, which involves
the nonenforcement of clauses found by the court to be ambiguous
and contrary to the reasonable expectations of the weaker party 71
In recent years, the legislature has added many new statutes which
purport to establish extensive protection for consumers. 71  The Con-
sumers Legal Remedies Act,72 the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty
Act7" and the Unruh Act 74 outline rights and remedies for consumers
who are damaged as a result of deceptive business practices, failure
by the seller to fulfill warranties and unlawful terms in credit sales.75
This collection of statutes relating to wrongfully obtained consent and
specific remedies for consumers appears at first impression to afford
considerable protection to those who suffer abuse as a result of
unequal bargaining power.76  But a closer examination reveals that
this existing law fails to remedy adequately abuses in consumer trans-
actions. Corbin states that:
[T]here is sufficient flexibility in the concepts of fraud, duress, mis-
representation, and undue influence, not to mention differences in
economic bargaining power, to enable courts to avoid enforcement
of a bargain that is shown to be unconscionable by reason of gross
inadequacy of consideration accompanied by other relevant fac-
tors. 7
7
However, because of the pervasive influence of the freedom of contract
69 See text accompanying notes 86-94 infra.
70. See text accompanying notes 182-201 infra.
71. CAL. BUS. & PROF CODE § 17500 (West 1964) (false advertising declared
unlawful); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1584.5-84.6 (West Supp. 1973) (unsolicited mailing
of goods deemed unconditional gift); rd. § 1689.5-89.13 (West 1973) (buyer's three
day right to cancel home solicitation contract); id. §§ 1747-47.90 (Song-Beverly Credit
Card Act of 1971); id. § 1750-57 (Consumer Credit Reporting Act); id. 1750-84
(Consumers Legal Remedies Act); id. § 1790-95.5 (Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty
Act); id. §§ 1801-12.10 (Unruh Act, credit sales); id., §9 1812.50-12.68 (contracts
for dance studio lessons), id. § 1812.80-12.95 (contracts for health studio services);
id. § 3369(3), (5) (injunctions against unfair competition and false advertising).
72. CAL. CIV. CODE §9 1750-84 (West 1973).
73. Id. § 1790-95.5.
74. Id. §§ 1801-12.10.
75. Of the eleven groups of statutes listed m note 71 supra, only these three
acts will be discussed.
76. See note 71 supra.
77. 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 128, at 551 (1963).
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doctrine, California courts have not satisfactorily utilized the flexibility
supposedly inherent m these concepts.
The California case law relating to consumer transactions is
poorly developed in the sense that it is difficult to ascertain what the
various rules are and to predict what situations give rise to voidable
contracts. It will be useful to review the basic case law winch attempts
to define (1) the technique of interpretation to avoid harsh results,78
(2) undue influence, 79 (3) duress,80 (4) fraud,81 and (5) the adhe-
sion contracts doctrine.82 A brief description of the Consumers Legal
Remedies Act,8 3 the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act,"4 and the
Unruh Act8 5 will then be given. The conclusion drawn from this
examination is that there are many gaps in the existing law. Such
gaps should be filled by the development of a standard of unconscion-
ability. This standard is a suitable one with which to evaluate cases
characterized by abuse due to superior bargaining power that fall out-
side the present statutory prohibitions.
Interpretation to Avoid Harsh Results
Faced with a case which would clearly call for a finding of uncon-
scionability in a state which has enacted section 2-302, a California
judge may sometimes achieve the same result by an imaginative inter-
pretation of the contract. But while the court may thus surreptitiously
achieve a just result, the real source of the problem-significant lack
of knowledge or power by one of the contracting parties-is not dealt
with at all. The court seeks only to avoid a harsh result.8 6
This avoidance technique is illustrated by Burr v. Sherwin Wil-
liams Co. 7  Plaintiff purchased insecticide spray for his cotton crop.
The container's label specified that the contents were 90 percent active
ingredients, which were listed, and 10 percent inert ingredients, which
were not listed; the label disclaimed all express or implied warranties.88
78. See text accompanying notes 86-94 infra.
79. See text accompanying notes 95-109 inf'ra.
80. See text accompanying notes 110-146 infra.
81. See text accompanying notes 147-181 infra.
82. See text accompanying notes 182-201 infra.
83. See text accompanying notes 208-212 infra.
84. See text accompanying notes 213-238 infra.
85. See text accompanying notes 239-251 infra.
86. See Patterson, supra note 38, at 858-59.
87. 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954).
88. "Seller makes no warranty of any kind, express or implied, concerning the
use of this product. Buyer assumes all risk in use or handling, whether in accordance
with directions or not." Id. at 693, 268 P.2d at 1047.
The spray contained a commonly used weed killer, a plant hormone,
which was not listed as one of the active ingredients. When the buyer
used the; insecticide as directed, his cotton plants grew abnormally
and production was adversely affected. The court ordered a new trial,
and observed that despite the disclaimer, the defendant probably had vio-
lated a warranty of description.8 9 Finding that the plant hormone
was not an inert ingredient, the court noted that the complete dis-
claimer of warranties did not encompass a warranty of description.9"
The Burr result was arguably a proper one, but the court achieved
it by construing the language of the label in a way clearly not intended
by the party drafting the terms."' Thus, the court did not face the
issue of whether one party should be allowed to disclaim the warranty
without the other party's specific consent to such a term. Such con-
struction of language invites contract draftsmen to try again to
disclaim warranties in the same manner, using different language.9"
It also distorts the common meaning of the language, which may con-
strain judges in future cases when a more literal construction of the
same words or phrases may be necessary to the proper result.93 The
indirect approach in Burr made it possible to avoid the issue of consent
given without knowledge of a crucial term. Thus, despite the result,
the case neither clarifies nor contributes to an accumulation of author-
ity defining the minimum decencies94 of bargaining conduct for certain
types of transactions.
Undue Influence
The doctrine of undue influence deals only with the extreme situa-
tion in which a person relies upon and trusts another to such an ex-
tent that he is in a completely subservient state of mind. This type
of relationship, of course, does not lead to a bargain in any sense
89. Id. at 697, 268 P.2d at 1049.
90. "The language does not purport to disclaim the implied warranty that the
substance in the drums actually meets the description of the prodict " Id. at
695, 268 P.2d at 1048.
91. See CAL. COMM. CODE §§ 1201(11), 1205, 2104 (West 1964). It is not
appropriate to deal here with the Califorma strict liability in tort doctrine. See gen-
erally Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). However, it should be noted that the doctrine's limits are
such that warranty disclaimers continue to be viable at least where the injury is solely
in terms of pecuniary loss. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(2).
92. See Llewellyn, supra note 38, at 702-03.
93. See also Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. Rav. 457, 463-68 (1897).
94. See Llewellyn, supra note 38, at 703.
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of the word. However, the doctrine can be seen as an attempt to
deal with a complete lack of knowledge in a contracting situation.
California's statutory definition of undue influence includes the
"taking an unfair advantage of another's weakness of mind; or ...
taking a grossly oppressive and unfair advantage of another's necessi-
ties or distress."9 5 At first, California courts interpreted the concept
of undue influence in such a way as to emphasize the person's incom-
petence-for example, senility.98  Later cases held that a weaker party
need not be mentally incompetent; it is sufficient that he is especially
susceptible because of the unlimited trust which he placed in the other
party.97
At first, these later cases required an intimate relationship such
as nurse and patient.98 The ties between such persons would naturally
be so close that the opportunity to take advantage of mental infirmity
is readily apparent. Thus, when a gross inequality of exchanged
values was also shown, the situation was an appropriate one for appli-
cation of the doctrine.99
The requirement of an intimate relationship has been modified
by more recent cases. The courts now recognize that persons may
assent to an agreement as a result of advice and direction from a
party who is accorded a special position of trust or deference. The
opportumty for taking unfair advantage exists here, as well as in the
traditional situation. The gravamen of the wrong is the abuse of some
special relationship of trust between the parties. The special relation-
ship necessary for application of the doctrine goes beyond relatives,
close friends, or personal attendants, but it is not clear how far beyond.
The troublesome nature of the doctrine's special-relationship re-
quirement is illustrated in Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School District.100
An elementary school teacher was under contract to teach for an
entire year. He was taken into police custody and charged with crim-
inally homosexual conduct. The teacher was bailed out of jail after
forty sleepless hours of being processed and interrogated by police
officers. When he arrived home, he received a visit from his principal
95. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1575 (West 1954).
96. Herbert v. Lankershim, 9 Cal. 2d 409, 476, 71 P.2d 220, 253 (1937).
97. E.g., Stenger v. Anderson, 66 Cal. 2d 970, 979-80, 429 P.2d 164, 170-71,
59 Cal. Rptr. 844, 850-51 (1967); Wells Fargo Bank & Umon Trust Co. v. Brady,
116 Cal. App. 2d 381, 397-99, 254 P.2d 71, 81-82 (1953).
98. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lankershum, 9 Cal. 2d 409, 71 P.2d 220 (1937).
99. See Cortez v. Weymouth, 235 Cal. App. 2d 140, 45 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1965).
100. 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 54 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1966).
and the superintendent of the district. They told him that they were
trying to help, that he had no time to consult an attorney, and that
he should sign a resignation at once. If he refused, they promised
promptly to perform their duty and dismiss hin for improper con-
duct.' 10 Further, they would exercise their power to publicize the
proceedings, 0 2 and thereby rum is chances of securing employment
elsewhere. He signed the resignation.
When the criminal charges were later dropped, the teacher sued
for declaratory relief and rescission of the resignation. The complaint
set out claims of both duress and undue influence. The court rejected
the former0 3 but held that the complaint stated a cause of action
for undue Influence.' 04 The court reasoned that the special circum-
stances requirement of unfair advantage had been met. 10 5 In the
first place, the teacher was in a state of physical weakness after
the long hours of custody More importantly, the principal exploited
his position as friend and supervisor by telling the teacher that his
advice would substitute for that of a lawyer and by promising, at
the same time, to rum the man if he did not comply with the demand
to resign. This conduct was within the statutory proscription against
"taking a grossly oppressive and unfair advantage of another's necessi-
ties or distress."'0 6  The court stated that undue influence is a "short-
hand legal phrase used to describe persuasion which tends to be coer-
cive in nature, persuasion which overcomes the will without convincing
the judgment.' 0 7
The special-circumstances requirement restricts the doctrine of
undue influence to a small category of contractual situations. The
doctrine is almost totally inapplicable to ordinary market situations,
which evidence lesser degrees of powerlessness and ignorance than
101. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 13409 (West 1969), as amended, CAL. EDUC. CODE §
13409 (West Supp. 1972).
102. Meetings of school boards are required to be open to the public. Id. §
966 (West 1969). However, closed sessions may be held to consider "dismissal of
a public employee " CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54957 (West Supp. 1973).
103. 246 Cal. App. 2d at 128, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 538. The court's definition of
duress was restricted only to unlawful acts. Id., accord, Goldstein v. Enoch, 248 Cal.
App. 2d 891, 894, 57 Cal. Rptr. 19, 22 (1967); London Homes, Inc. v. Korn, 234
Cal. App. 2d 233, 240, 44 Cal. Rptr. 262, 266 (1965). Contra, Young v. Hoagland,
212 Cal. 426, 298 P 996 (1931). But see Balling v. Finch, 203 Cal. App. 2d 413,
21 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1962). See text accompanying notes 125-130 infra.
104. 246 Cal. App. 2d at 135, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
105. Id. at 131, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
106. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1575 (West 1954).
107 246 Cal. App. 2d at 130, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25
November 1973] CALIFORNIA UNCONSCIONABILITY STATUTE 21
in the typical undue influence case. The only time the doctrine really
works is where there is some relationship between the parties in which
trust and depndence have, as a matter of course, developed to such
an extent that, in effect, the weaker party either gives all contracting
power to the other person l10 or is forced to give it up by coercion.109
Therefore, the doctrine contributes little to the policing of contracts
against oppression and unfair surprise.
Economic Duress
Some aspects of the appropriate use of power in the bargaining
process have historically been regulated by the common law doctrines
of duress and menace. Early common law defined duress as the use
of unlawful force and pressure, directed against one's person in order
to make him sign a contract."10 Somewhat later, courts extended the
concept of personal duress to include threats against possessions,
known as duress of goods."' A threat to damage one's goods, with
an apparent capacity to carry out the threat, came to be known as
menace."12  Duress and menace are logical extensions of the law's
policy to deter tortious and criminal conduct. California codified the
duress doctrine" 3 and early decisions" 4 applied the established prin-
ciples by granting relief only for agreements that had been coerced
by unlawful acts or threats.'
More recently, California courts have developed a major extension
of the theory into more common business situations involving economic
duress. Economic duress may occur either at the time of the contract's
formation,'1 6 or later when an existing contractual relationship is mod-
ified."17
108. Cortez v. Weymouth, 235 Cal. App. 2d 140, 45 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1965).
109. Odonzzi v. Bloomfield School Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 54 Cal. Rptr.
533 (1966).
110. 1 W BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARES ON THE LAw oF ENGLAND § 178, at 224
(W. Jones ed. 1916).
111. F WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI CoNTRACTS, H8 212-13, at 337-38 (1913).
112. See CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 1570 (West 1954); Odonzzi v. Bloomfield School
Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 128, 54 Cal. Rptr. 533, 538 (1966). Duress itself
was later expanded to include threats against the person as well as actual use of force
or pressure.
113. CAL. Civ. CODE H8 1570 (West 1954).
114. E.g., Taylor v. Ford, 131 Cal. 440, 63 P 770 (1901); Tisdale v. Bryant,
38 Cal. App. 750, 177 P 510 (1918).
115. 7 CALIF. L. Rv. 188 (1919).
116. See, e.g., Sun-Maid Raisin Growers v. Papazman, 74 Cal. App. 231, 240 P
47 (1925).
117. See, e.g., London Homes, Inc. v. Korn, 234 Cal. App. 2d 233, 44 Cal. Rptr.
An unequal bargaining relationship is a common factor in eco-
nomic duress cases. The existence of this fact alone, however, will
not result in a contract automatically being voided.118 Some cases
have found economic duress when the inequality was created by a
wrongful act. This is clearly illustrated m Thompson Crane & Truck-
ing Co. v Eyman," 9 in which a certified public accountant was em-
ployed to establish a new bookkeeping system and compute the current
year's income tax. On his advice, amended tax returns for the previous
three years were filed. The Treasury Department's response was an
assessment of $118,000 deficiency for the past years.
The accountant agreed to handle a protest for the client, setting
his fee at $1,000. Two days before the expiration of the allowed
period for filing a protest, the accountant demanded that the client
sign a contract promising seven and one-half percent of whatever
relief was granted. Fearing the worst, the client assigned a note he
held to the accountant. In an mterpleader action by the original maker
of the note, the court voided the assignment.12 The finding of duress
was based on the creation of an unequal relationship through a wrong-
ful breach of contract, which threatened disaster to the client. 2 '
In Steffen v Refrigeration Discount Corp.,22 mortgages were ex-
ecuted with an acceleration clause providing that the mortgagee could
demand full payment if there was a default on any installment. When
the plaintiff fell behind in his payments, he tried to sell is equity
to pay off the mortgages. The mortgagee refused to release the mort-
gages unless the plaintiff paid unearned interest on the accelerated
payments, totaling over $12,000. Plaintiff made the payment and
sued to recover. The court's finding of economic duress emphasized
the compulsion of defendant's action.'1 3  Had he tried to force pay-
ment of something he was entitled to, there probably would have been
no actionable economic duress.' 2 4
262 (1965); Thompson Crane & Trucking Co. v. Eyman, 123 Cal. App. 2d 904, 267
P.2d 1043 (1954); Steffen v. Refrigeration Discount Corp., 91 Cal. App. 2d 494, 205
P.2d 727 (1949).
118. One commentator erroneously predicted that the unconscionability doctrine
would so develop. Note, Economic Duress and Business Compulsion in California,
40 CALWF L. REv. 425, 426 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Economic Duress].
119. 123 Cal. App. 2d 904, 267 P.2d 1043 (1954). See generally Note, Contracts
-Economic Duress, 28 S. CAL. L. REV. 317 (1955).
120. 123 Cal. App. 2d at 909-10, 267 P.2d at 1046-47
121. Id.
122. 91 Cal. App. 2d 494, 205 P.2d 727 (1949).
123. Id. at 498, 205 P.2d at 729.
124. See Economic Duress, supra note 118, at 429.
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Thus, the key factor in economic duress cases is a wrongful act
being committed by the superior party that harms the economic inter-
ests of the weaker party. The problem is one of setting standards
to determine, first, what acts are so wrongful that they should not
be allowed as bargaining tactics, and second, what economic harm
to the weaker party will suffice to support a finding of economic
duress. For example, threats to business are an ordinary part of bar-
gaining, m the sense that one may threaten not to contract unless
some desired term is incorporated into the contract. 125 This is a threat
to the other party's prospects for benefit from the transaction and
as such is not economic duress.
The standard for wrongful acts in early cases was an easy one
to apply: conduct that was criminal or tortious was not allowed. 26
Since these acts would be actionable in any other context, they are
also sufficient as a defense to contract enforcement. Threats to busi-
ness interests, however, were not recognized as actionable.127  This
unlawful acts standard was eroded in California when the courts came
to realize that threats to business interests deprived a party of choices
commonly available to freely bargaining parties. 28 The only discern-
able standard of wrongful acts in modem California cases is the neces-
sarily ephemeral one of prevailing community standards. 129 However,
in California, a mere threat to breach a contract still does not consti-
tute economic duress.'30
Compulsion exerted upon the weaker party is wrongful in that
it deprives him of the freedom of choice essential to a binding state-
ment of consent. Thus, the theory of economic duress must include
some guidelines regarding the appropriateness of the weaker party's
125. See, e.g., Hale, supra note 58, at 620-21.
126. See text accompanying notes 110-115, supra.
127. Taylor v. Ford, 131 Cal. 440, 63 P 770 (1901); Tisdale v. Bryant, 38 Cal.
App. 750, 177 P 510 (1918).
128. One of the first extensions of the duress doctrine to include economic threats
came in Sun-Maid Raisin Growers v. Papazian, 74 Cal. App. 231, 240 P. 47 (1925),
where threats of physical destruction to a farmer's crops were made to induce him
to contract with a sellers' cooperative which would have set the price to be charged
for his crops.
129. Economic Duress, supra note 118, at 427.
130. London Homes, Inc. v. Korn, 234 Cal. App. 2d 233, 44 Cal. Rptr. 262
(1965); Sistrom v. Anderson, 51 Cal. App. 2d 213, 124 P.2d 372 (1942). In Thomp-
son Crane & Trucking Co. v. Eyman, 123 Cal. App. 2d 904, 267 P.2d 1043 (1954),
the wrongfulness of the accountant's threat not to perform must be measured by the
additional factor that he placed the client in a vise with no way out. The court
described the wrongful conduct as "very real compulsion no less real because
an incidental breach of contract was also involved." Id. at 909, 267 P.2d at 1046.
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conduct. If he was not justified in yielding to a threat, the doctrine
does not recognize a valid claim to the defense."' The first California
case of economic duress decided favorably for the weaker party,
Young v Hoagland,"13 held that if a reasonable, prudent man would
have perceived a threat to his economic interests and assented to a
contract to avoid the threat, he would have a valid defense of economic
compulsion.13
The reasonable man standard appears to be a fair attempt to
balance the rights of the parties to the transaction. However, its inter-
pretation by later decisions has been unexpectedly harsh. A reason-
able man is expected to know and assert any legal remedies available
to him which would adequately protect his rights against the threat.134
Other California courts, however, have rejected the harsh objective
standard and have instead focused upon the actual state of mind of
the party who assents under pressure. In the recent case of Balling
v Finch, 1 5 the court set down its notion of the proper focus of analy-
sis:
There is no legal standard of resistance with which the person acted
upon must comply at the peril of being remediless for a wrong done
to him The question in each case [is] Was the per-
son so acted upon by threats of the person claiming the benefit of
the contract as to be bereft of the quality of mind essential
to the making of a contract, and was the contract thereby
obtained?136
The defendant was a lawyer employed to help form a corporation.
Before the permit to issue stock was obtained, plaintiff, one of the
promoters, paid the lawyer $4,140 in exchange for a promise to offer
that amount of common stock when the permit was granted. Plaintiff
then changed his mind and demanded the return of his check. He
threatened to complain to the district attorney or the Corporation Com-
missioner or both that the sale was illegal because the permit had
13 1. See Economic Duress, supra note 118, at 428-29.
132. 212 Cal. 426, 298 P 996 (1931). In Young, the directors of a corporation
levied an assessment on the stockholders; they were then voted out of office and re-
placed by a board which rescinded the assessment. The members of the old board
contested the election and threatened to sell stock. The stockholders acquiesced, paid
the assessment and then sued.
133. Id. at 431, 298 P at 998. Cf. Sistrom v. Anderson, 51 Cal. App. 2d 213,
124 P.2d 372 (1942). See Economic Duress, supra note 118, at 428-29.
134. See, e.g., Wester Gulf Oil Co. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d
257, 265, 206 P.2d 643, 648 (1949) (a person who paid money to prevent an improper
forfeiture of a lease was not a reasonably prudent man; he bad an adequate remedy
available-a declaratory judgment action).
135. 203 Cal. App. 2d 413, 21 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1962).
136. Id. at 419, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
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not yet been issued. To avoid what he perceived to be a threat to
his business reputation, the lawyer returned some of the money to
the plaintiff and gave a promissory note for the remainder; when the
lawyer failed to pay on the note, the plaintiff sued.
The court remanded the case in order for the trial court to de-
termine whether "all these considerations nght well have so acted
upon [the lawyer's] mind that he . . . did not at the time he signed
the note possess 'the quality of mind essential to the making of a
contract.' 117 By so emphasizing the weaker party's feeling of being
threatened with no recourse but to make the agreement, the court
focused upon the crucial element of bargaining process, the lack of
free assent by the coerced party. The court in Balling thus modified
the reasonable-response test and focused on the weaker party's state
of mind. In essence, if one protects his interests when they are threat-
ened by wrongful conduct, his response is reasonable.
In addition to gaps in the reasoning of the California decisions
on economic duress, the cases are m conflict on the appropriate tests
to be applied in measuring the wrongfulness of the acts by the superior
bargaining party and the response of the weaker party. The conflict
cannot be rationalized as a developmental trend in the decisions. Al-
though the weight of authority is with the line of cases allowing re-
covery when economic interests are threatened,'-3 several recent cases
have reverted to a restrictive test associated with the duress doctrine
existing prior to Young v Hoagland.3 '
London Homes, Inc. v. Korn,140 in particular, illustrates the cur-
rent confusion. The executors of a family estate represented to a
developer that they had full authority to sell a tract of land, when
in fact their authority extended to only a part of the entire tract. After
orally contracting to buy the whole tract from the executors, the de-
veloper purchased surrounding land from third parties and went to
the expense of getting a zoning variance to subdivide. The executors
then threatened to breach the oral agreement, claiming they didn't
have authority to sell. However, they would attempt to get such au-
thority if the buyer would pay several hundred dollars more per acre.
To protect what he had already invested, the developer agreed to the
new terms and the sale was completed. The developer sued to re-
137. Id. at 420, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
138. See, e.g., Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal. 2d 195, 1 Cal. Rptr. 12, 347 P.2d
12 (1959); Bailing v. Finch, 203 Cal. App. 2d 413, 21 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1962); Thomp-
son Crane & Trucking Co. v. Eyman, 123 Cal. App. 2d 904, 267 P.2d 1043 (1954).
139. 212 Cal. 426, 298 P 996 (1931).
140. 234 Cal. App. 2d 233, 44 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1965).
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cover the additional amount he was forced to pay The court refused
to allow recovery on a theory of economic duress, ruling that the
threat did not amount to an unlawful act, since the executors threat-
ened merely not to perform on the contract.' 4 '
The court's reasoning in Korn is deficient. The threat of nonper-
formance should be sufficient compulsion to justify a legal remedy,
if the threat was made possible by the weaker party's reliance on a
prior representation. 14  The unequal bargaining position of the execu-
tors and the land developer was itself created by the wrongful act
of the executors, much like the situation in Thomson Crane & Trucking
Co v Eyman.'4 3 It is not the mere nonperformance of the contract
which was threatened; it was a prior inducement which placed the weaker
party in a position of dependence, thereby coercing him to accede to
the new demands.
There is also confusion in the decisions regarding the appropriate
standard of behavior to be required of the weaker bargaining party
The objective reasonable man test was reaffirmed in the last case of
economic duress decided by the state supreme court."' Yet, more
recently, in Balling v Finch,'45 a court of appeal applied a subjective
standard, which focused on the state of mind of the coerced party
and his perception of the threat to his economic interests. 46
Even if the present inconsistencies and conflicts are resolved by
either judicial or legislative changes, the doctrine of duress, including
economic compulsion, is inadequate to correct some serious abuses
of superior power in bargaining. In many cases, assent may still be
coerced, even when there is no wrongful act by the stronger party
The question answered by the economic duress decisions is: how much
can one take advantage of his own wrongdoing. The courts have
not addressed the more general question of the extent to which one
can take advantage of his superior bargaining strength when an un-
141. Id. at 240-41, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 266-67
142. See text accompanying notes 119-21 supra.
143. See Thompson Crane & Trucking Co. v. Eyman, 123 Cal. App. 2d 904,
267 P.2d 1043 (1954).
144. Leeper v. Beltram, 53 Cal. 2d 195, 347 P.2d 12, 1 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1959).
Confusion in the courts of appeal is further illustrated by Goldstein v. Enoch, 248
Cal. App. 2d 891, 57 Cal. Rptr. 19 (1967), m which the court restricted the issue to
"whether the defendant intentionally exerted an unlawful pressure on the injured party
to deprive him of contractual volition and induce him to act to his own detriment."
Id. at 894-95, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 22 (emphasis added). This restrictive definition of
duress was abandoned long ago in Young v. Hoagland, 212 Cal. 426, 298 P 996
(1931).
145. 203 Cal. App. 2d 413, 21 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1962).
146. See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra.
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equal bargaining situation is not wrongfully created by the superior
bargaining party. The doctrine does not apply to market transactions
in which unfair contracts result from abuses of pre-existing bargain-
ing superiority.
Finally, the only remedy that has been permitted m the California
duress cases has been complete rescission of the agreement. The
theory of economic duress assumes that the compulsion to make the
contract pervades the entire agreement and that a party's expression
of assent under wrongful pressure deprives him of the necessary state
of mind to become bound to any part of the contract. But this may
not always be the case. A weaker party may want a contract, if it
were a fair agreement, but not a particular oppressive term imposed
by pressure from the superior party. The courts should entertain the
possibility of a more specific remedy which would lend itself to a
balancing of the parties' interests.
Fraud
A contract may be voidable if consent of a party is obtained
by fraud.147  A finding of fraud supports an award of actual dam-
ages148 or restitutionary relief based on rescission.1 49  It is commonly
stated 50 that the essential elements of a cause of action for fraud
are (1) false statement of a material fact; (2) knowledge of the falsity
of the representation, lack of honest belief in its truth, or lack of
information sufficient to justify the assertion; (3) intent to induce
reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage.' 5 '
147. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1566-67 (West 1954); id. § 1689 (West Supp. 1973).
148. Id. § 3343 (West 1973). See also id. § 3294 (West 1970) (award
of punitive damages for oppression, fraud, or malice).
149. Id. § 1692 (West 1973).
150. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 811, 484 P.2d 964,
970, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 802 (1971); 2 B. WrriIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFoRNU LAW
Torts, § 186 (7th ed. 1960).
151. The requirement of resulting damage does not always necessitate out-of-
pocket damages or an exact showing of pecumary loss. The California Civil Code
provides that a defrauded party shall be awarded only the difference between the actual
value of what he parted with and the actual value of what he received (plus conse-
quential damages). Cal. Civ. Code § 3343(a) (West Supp. 1973). This measure
of damages has been labeled "out-of-pocket" W. PRossER & I. WADP, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 831 (1971). Section 3343 does not authorize loss-of-the-bargain
damages based on the difference between the value of property as represented and
the actual value thereof. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3343(b) (1) (West Supp. 1973). However,
section 3343 does not purport to affect any other remedies provided by law. Id. §
3343(b) (2). The California Commercial Code provides that remedies for fraud in
the sale of goods shall include all remedies available for non-fraudulent breach under
Division 2 of the Code. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2721 (West 1964). The California
Code Comment to section 2721 indicates that one defrauded in a sale of goods might
California Civil Code section 1572 defines actual fraud.152 This
statute makes certain types of false representations actionable if made
with an intent to deceive another party or to induce him to enter
into the contract. The types of representations which will be action-
able include false statements made without belief in the truth of the
matter stated'53 and false assertions which are made in a manner not
warranted by the information of the person making them although
he believes them to be true.1' 4 The latter category has been called
negligent misrepresentation and constitutes actionable fraud under Cal-
ifornia law "I The last section of the statute also includes "any other
act fitted to deceive" within the defimtion of actual fraud.' 56
The gist of fraud is the use of false representations to induce
consent or reliance which results in harm to the party thus deceived.
The rule is simple to state but difficult to apply in most sale of goods
transactions. For example, 157 assume that a retail seller of home freez-
ers approaches a potential purchaser at his home and states that his
freezers are of high quality, guaranteed for a lifetime, and are sold
at a reasonable retail price. He further explains that the purchase
of a freezer includes the privilege of buying a seven month supply
of frozen food at wholesale prices, and that the total cost for the freezer
and food is less than the amount the consumer spends each month
on food in retail grocery stores. The purchaser responds by signing
a retail installment contract for the purchase of a home freezer and
a supply of frozen food. The contract is immediately assigned to
a finance company which had previously agreed with the seller to pur-
chase a certain number of such contracts.
After receiving the freezer, the consumer discovers that similar
models sell in local appliance stores for one third to one half the price,
therefore recover the difference between the value of property as represented and the
actual value thereof (loss-of-the-bargain damages), notwithstanding Section 3343 of
the Civil Code. Id. California Code Comment 1.
In order to obtain rescission under Section 1689 of the Civil Code, it is not neces-
sary to plead or prove itemized damages as a result of fraud; a showing of any result-
ing pecuniary injury or prejudice will suffice. Spreckels v. Gorrill, 152 Cal. 383, 388,
92 P 1011, 1014 (1907); Horn v. Guaranty Chevrolet Motors. 270 Cal. App. 2d 477,
483, 75 Cal. Rptr. 871, 875 (1969).
152. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1572 (West 1954). See also id. § 1710 (definition of
deceit).
153. Id. § 1572(1).
154. Id. § 1572(2).
155. 2 B. WiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Torts § 207 (7th ed. 1960).
156. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1572(5) (West 1954). See also id. § 1573 (definition
of constructive fraud).
157 This example is based on the facts underlying Vasquez v. Superior Court,
4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
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that it is unlikely that this particular seller could honor the life-time
guarantee, and that the price for the frozen food was in fact the average
retail rather than wholesale price. He is also met with the demand
by the assignee finance company to pay on the contract in spite of
any claims against the retail seller.
Has the purchaser in this example been defrauded? In attempt-
ing to bring an action for fraud, the consumer would be faced with
a formidable array of defenses. The seller may contend that the repre-
sentations as to price were only statements of opimon and therefore
not actionable. 158 He could insist that such statements were only
common puffing and that the buyer had no right to rely on such asser-
tions.15 9 It might be said that the seller made such representations
with a reasonable and honest belief in their truth. 60
In an action to rescind the contract or as a defense against a
suit to enforce the agreement, the buyer will be met with a demand
that fraud be proved by clear and convincing proof.' 6' If the alleged
representations were oral and never written, the seller may simply deny
that any such statements were ever made. He could rely on a clause
in the standard form contract to the effect that the buyer agrees that
there were no representations made which were not incorporated in
the written contract. Furthermore, the seller could insist upon proof
that consent to the contract would not have been given had such al-
leged misrepresentations not existed. 162 This defense relates to a sim-
lar argument to the effect that if the statements do not concern material
facts, no fraud has been committed. 63 An attorney who faces facts
similar to these would probably hesitate to bring an action because
of the difficulty in overcoming the above mentioned defenses in order
to prove all the elements of fraud. However, recent decisions indicate
that the law of fraud has been somewhat liberalized.16 4  There is im-
plicit in such decisions a concept that consumers have a right to
rely on almost any representations used in selling products and that
158. B. WrrxN, SummARY oF CALIFORNIA LAw Torts § 187 (7th ed. 1960).
159. Id. § 203.
160. The existence of actual fraud is always a question of fact. CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 1574 (West 1954).
161. See, e.g., cases cited m 23 CAL. Jur. 2d Fraud & Deceit § 83 (1955).
162. Consent is deemed to have been obtained through fraud "only when it would
not have been given had such cause not existed." CAL. Cv. CODE § 1568 (West
1954).
163. See, e.g., cases cited in 23 CAL. Jur. 2d Fraud & Deceit § 24 (1955).
164. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796
(1971); Horn v. Guaranty Chevrolet Motors, 270 Cal. App. 2d 477, 75 Cal. Rptr.
871 (1969).
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the sellers' usual defenses will not be as effective in cases where the
parties are of unequal bargaining power.
The representations involved in the above example were in fact
the basis of a class action suit against a seller of freezers and three
finance companies in Vasquez v Superior Court.' The trial court
had overruled defendants' demurrer on the fraud count as to the named
plaintiffs and the California Supreme Court did not reject this rul-
mg.' 66  Thus it might be concluded that allegations of representations
of the type mentioned above are sufficient to withstand a demurrer.
In setting forth its version of the elements of fraud,'67 the Su-
preme Court cited only one case, Ach v Finkelsten.'68 The Ach
case states a somewhat liberalized rule as to the proof necessary to
sustain a finding of fraud:
There is no absolute or fixed rule for determining what facts will
constitute fraud; whether or not it is found depends upon the parti-
cular facts of the case under inquiry. Fraud may be proved by
direct evidence or it may be inferred from all of the circumstances
of the case 'Actual fraud is always a question of fact." 69
The Vasquez decision added to this formulation a rule that if the
court finds that material misrepresentations were made, at least an in-
ference of reliance arises.1 70  Similarly, it has been held that the requi-
site intent to deceive or to induce consent to a contract is normally
established by inference rather than by direct evidence.' 7 '
A last example illustrating the development in the California
fraud doctrine concerns the extent to which inadequacy of considera-
tion may be used as evidence of fraud. In California, as elsewhere,
inadequacy of consideration is no defense to the enforcement of a
contract voluntarily made.'7 2  The harshness of this rule is tempered
somewhat by the rule of State Finance Co. v Smith: "gross made-
quacy of consideration is some evidence of fraud."' 73  In this case,
165. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
166. Id. at 805-806, 484 P.2d at 967, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
167 Id. at 811, 484 P.2d at 970, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
168. 264 Cal. App. 2d 667, 70 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1968) (fraud arising from sale
of apartment house).
169. Id. at 674-75, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 477
170. 4 Cal. 3d at 814, 484 P.2d at 973, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
171. Horn v. Guaranty Chevrolet Motors, 270 Cal. App. 2d 477, 483, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 871, 875 (1969).
172. See, e.g., Whelan v. Swam, 132 Cal. 389, 64 P 560 (1901).
173. 44 Cal. App. 2d 688, 691, 112 P.2d 901, 903 (1941). A statement inducing
assent to a bargain must be accurate; if not, then an action for fraud or for rescission
based on mistake may arise. The Uniform Commercial Code requires parties to all
Code transactions to exercise good faith. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-203. This
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a buyer gave a three hundred dollar note for a used truck. When
the vehicle was delivered, the buyer discovered it was worth about
twenty-five dollars as junk. Justice Peters, speaking for the court of
appeals, held that the difference between price and value was so great
as to be evidence of fraud, even though there was no explicit finding
of any misrepresentations of material fact.' 4 Describing the transac-
tion as unconscionable because the truck was outrageously overpriced,
the court refused to allow the assignee of the seller to recover on
the note.7'7
Such an approach to the problem of lack of knowledge in bar-
gaining is confusing authority at best. The rule that inadequacy of
consideration is no defense to the enforcement of a valid contract was
ritually recanted, 78 but the consequences of the role were avoided
by a finding of fraud.177  However, it is not clear how much dispar-
ity between price and value will be sufficient. to sustain a finding of
fraud.
This discussion indicates that it is difficult to give a precise defi-
intion of fraud. In a consumer setting, it would appear that the most
crucial elements are that false representations of material fact were
made by the seller and that the net effect of the transaction has been
to cause some pecuniary loss to the buyer. Once these two elements
are shown, reliance and intent to induce reliance may be rnferred. 178
Because any false statement except an innocent and reasonable one
may be actionable, proof of the falsity of the statement will generally
establish the element of scienter as well. One court of appeals case
in 1941 has allowed a finding of fraud in a consumer setting based
primarily upon evidence of gross inadequacy of consideration.' 79
The doctrine of fraud as just described offers considerable protec-
tion against the more extreme forms of abuse. But the historical pref-
erence for direct proof of all five elements 80 and the ambiguous state
is defined as honesty m fact for any party, id. § 1-201(19), and honesty m fact plus
fair dealing m the trade for merchants m transactions for the sale of goods. Id. §
2-103(1) (b). The theory of fraud assumes that the party being fooled does not have
knowledge of the facts at the time of bargaining; presumably, if he did, he would
not rely on the misrepresentations. The result is a gross disparity between what he
legitimately expected he would get from the bargain and what he actually got.
174. 44 Cal. App. 2d at 69-93, 112 P.2d at 903-04.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 691, 112 P.2d at 903.
177. The only case cited in support of this result was Herbert v. Lankershim,
9 Cal. 2d 409, 71 P.2d 220 (1937).
178. See notes 170-71 supra.
179. State Fin. Co. v. Smith, 44 Cal. App. 2d 688, 112 P.2d 901 (1941).
180. See, e.g., Ach v. Finkelstein, 264 Cal. App. 2d 667, 70 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1968).
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of the case law interpreting Civil Code section 1572 make this doc-
trine too unreliable and uncertain to constitute a tool with which courts
may police the making of contracts in a consumer setting. The com-
plexity of the rule also deters attorneys from taking consumer cases
because it usually involves more extensive research and preparation
for trial than the potential recovery justifies. The necessity for proof
of specific conduct which will or will not constitute fraud encourages
sellers simply to invent new forms of sales tactics which impose the
same result on the consumer (disparity between price and value, or
other harsh terms) without the use of explicitly false representations.'
The doctrine of fraud may thus tend to inhibit the use of false state-
ments but does nothing otherwise to alleviate the major problems due
to abuse of superior bargaining power. A standard by which the
fairness of contracts may be evaluated is essential to a legal system
which seeks to protect consumers, and the law of fraud is simply not
designed to provide this standard.
Adhesion Contract Doctrine
Perhaps the most significant California approach to problems of
bargaining knowledge and power has been the recent growth of the
doctrine of adhesion contracts. 182 The contract of adhesion in Cali-
forna has come to mean:
[A] standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the
party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing
party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it, 8 3
This definition seems to assume that the party who adheres to the
contract has adequate knowledge of all the terms of the agreement
but is not in a position to influence or change any terms; he can
only take it all or leave it all. However, the California cases8 4 have
uniformly regarded the term as applicable only to contracts where
the problem was lack of knowledge-that is, to contracts in which
"'All of these elements must be present if actionable fraud is found; one element
absent is fatal to recovery.'" Id. at 674, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 477
181. "Fraud, 'being infinite and taking on protean form at will,' rears its head
in a variety of transactions. It is therefore fitting that courts have developed a large
body of remedies to meet its 'versatile inventions.'" P KEETON & M. SHAPO, PRODUCTS
AND THE CONSUMER: DECEPTIVE PRACTICES 19 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
182. See note 38 supra.
183. Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 694, 10 Cal. Rptr.
781, 784 (1961).
184. See cases discussed in text accompanying notes 191-201 infra and those col-
lected in Comment, Contracts of Adhesion under California Law, I U.S.F.L. REv.
306 (1967).
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an adhering party knew only that he wanted to obtain the goods or
services and that he must sign a detailed agreement in order to have
what he wanted.
The doctrine of adhesion contracts was first explicitly recognized
in California in the context of insurance contracts. 185 Contracts of
the insurance industry have traditionally been regulated to a greater
extent than other commercial contracts, due to the public service char-
acter of the enterprise.' 86  Moreover, form-pad contracts have long
been standard operating procedure in the industry. Thus, for several
reasons, insurance was an obvious context for application of adhesion
contract principles.'8 7
In interpreting insurance contracts, a basic rule hag been that
the insurance policy will be strictly construed against the insurer when-
ever the terms of the contract are ambiguous. 88 Such a rule, which
predated the advent of the adhesion contracts doctrine, is based on
the assumption that the nondrafting party is likely to be ignorant of
the term in controversy and therefore it was probably not specifically
185. Mr. Justice Tobrner can be credited for playing a major role in the develop-
ment of the adhesion contract doctrine m California. First as a Judge on the California
Court of Appeal, Neal v. State Farm Insurance Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 781 (1961), then as a Supreme Court Justice, Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty
Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962); Gray v. Zurich Insur-
ance Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966), he has led the
way m recognizing the fact that modem consumers, especially insurance policy holders,
are subject to the dictates of those who draft the contract of adhesion.
186. See the discussion of public service enterprises in Tobriner & Grodin, The
Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the New Industrial State, 55 CALIF.
L. REV. 1247, 1266-82 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Tobrmer & Grodin]. Precursors
of the California doctrine of adhesion contracts may be seen in the context of disclaim-
ers of negligence in bank passbooks. In Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Home Savings
Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 P. 293 (1919), a depositor, when he opened Is account,
received a bank passbook limiting the time for objection for the bank's negligence
in preparing his balance statements to ten days. The court held the limitation invalid
because the depositor could not reasonably be expected to know about the limitation
at the time a negligent statement was issued. Accord, Frankini v. Bank of America,
12 Cal. App. 2d 298, 55 P.2d 232 (1936); Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App.
362, 248 P 947 (1926).
187. Contract of adhesion principles were first introduced into the United States
by Professor Edwin W. Patterson solely in the context of insurance contracts. Patter-
son, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARv. L. RFv. 198 (1919). More
than two decades later, Professor Friedrich Kessler pointed out to American lawyers
the general applicability of these principles. Kessler, supra note 58.
188. Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 871, 377 P.2d 284, 288, 27
Cal. Rptr. 172, 176 (1962). See cases collected in 1 B. Wrrc, SuMMAY OF CAliOR-
Ni LAW, CoNTRAcTs §§ 535-36 (8th ed. 1973). For a more precise analysis
of the rule's elements, see Patterson, supra note 38, at 855-59.
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assented to as an element of the agreement. 18 9 The reasonable expec-
tations of the adhering party, the insured, become the primary test
of what is a proper allocation of risks in the insurance policy By
this principle, insurance contract clauses have been given no effect
when they were "unclear, unexpected, inconspicuous, or unconscion-
able limitations of liability which would frustrate the reasonable expec-
tations of the insured.' 190
Two Califorma cases illustrate the operation of the adhesion con-
tract doctrine in the insurance policy field. Steven v Fidelity & Casu-
alty Co. 9' involved an insurance policy purchased from a vending
machine by an airplane passenger to cover his trip. The policy was
several pages long and included a clause limiting coverage to scheduled
flights. More obvious instructions directed the insured to fill out and
mail the policy to his beneficiary before he embarked on his trip;
thus, he had inadequate time to read the policy The insured's sched-
uled flight for one leg of the trip was cancelled and he chose to con-
tmue on a nonscheduled airline. When the plane crashed, the insured
was killed.
In deciding for the beneficiary, the Califorma Supreme Court
considered the inequality of bargaining positions and the reasonable
expectations of the insured. 92 These factors only came up, however,
after the court decided, as a threshold issue, that the policy contained
an ambiguous term. 9 3  Since the insured could not know that the
term excluded from coverage the type of flight which he took (after
cancellation of one leg of the journey), an objective reasonable-ex-
pectations standard was adopted.'
The reasonable-expectations approach is not limited to the partic-
ular fact situation of a vending machine, as Gray v Zurich Insurance
Co "I has shown. Gray, a medical doctor, had a standard Compre-
hensive Personal Liability policy, m which the company assumed a
189. It is just for this reason that a limitation on liability is accepted as valid
by the courts, if the term is specifically called to the attention of the insured and
he assents to it. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions,
83 HARV. L. REv. 961, 966-69 (1970).
190. Tobrner & Grodin, supra note 186, at 1273 (emphasis added); accord, Lowell
v. Maryland Cas. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 298, 419 P.2d 180, 54 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1966).
See also Keeton, Insurance Law Rights At Variance With Policy Provisions, 83 HARV.
L. R.v. 961, 966-74 (1970).
191. 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962).
192. Id. at 878-81, 377 P.2d at 294-96, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 182-84.
193. Id. at 872, 377 P.2d at 290, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
194. Id. at 869, 377 P.2d at 288, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
195. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
[Vol. 25
November 1973] CALIFORNIA UNCONSCIONABILITY STATUTE 35
duty to defend in any action, with certain exceptions. One excep-
tion was for "'bodily injury or property damages caused intentionally
by or at the direction of the insured.' ,"19 The insured injured a
third party in an altercation and was sued. The insurance company
refused to defend, claiming that the insured's act was an intentional
battery not covered by the policy. Gray lost the suit and in turn sued
the insurer. Holding that the company should have defended the in-
sured, the supreme court emphasized the reasonable expectations of
the insured, in light of his inability as a layman to understand whether
the policy covered the altercation. 197  The court treated the require-
ment of an ambiguous term as a part of the whole question of reason-
able expectations of the insured, and not as a threshold issue.
Gray and Steven each rvolved an insured who was ignorant of
how the insurer might interpret terms unfavorably and who was unable
to change them. The problem is one of unknowing assent to a clause
in a complex agreement that defeats the adhering party's reasonable
expectations of the contract's meaning. The solution is direct: the
insurance company must either abstain from limiting liability to less
than the reasonable expectations of the insured or it must make harsh
terms explicit m such a way that the expectations of the insured are
specifically based on the terms. It appears that the only way to take
the latter course is for the insurance company to point out the harsh
terms, explain their consequences and get a specific assent to them.
It is difficult to assess the scope of the California adhesion-con-
tracts doctrine. The elements found in insurance cases (an unequal
bargaining position, a contract drafted by the stronger party, and lim-
ited knowledge of terms by the adhering party) occur in many other
bargaining contexts, and the principles behind the doctrine certainly
make sense when applied to contracts of the more typical market trans-
action. 198 Yet, so far, the doctrine has only been extended slightly
beyond insurance policies. 99
196. Id. at 267, 419 P.2d at 170, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
197. Id. at 268-69, 419 P.2d at 171, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
198. "ihe favorite generalization advanced by outside observers to explain a
judgment against an insurance company at variance with policy provisions is the ambiva-
lent, suggestive, and wholly unsatisfactory aphorism: 'It's an insurance case."' Keeton,
Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 IAav. L. REv. 961 (1970).
Professor Keeton demonstrates that the principles behind a high percentage of insurance
cases have general application in other areas of contract law.
199. Since the first insurance decisions, the following contracts have been found
to be contracts of adhesion: a hospital's contract of admission to care, TunkI v. Re-
gents of the Umversity of California, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr.
33 (1963) (voiding a negligence disclaimer); an escrow agreement, Akin v. Business
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In one recent decision,200 proof that the parties had dickered to
some extent was enough to remove the agreements from the adhesion
contracts doctrine. Tius development seems consistent with the ex-
plicit rationale of the doctrine, as stated m the insurance cases. Ne-
gotiation between parties is some evidence that each knows what he
is agreeing to, although an unbalance of power may still exist. If,
however, the negotiating is not sufficiently extensive for the party ad-
hering to the contract to be aware of the contested term, the doctrine
should be a proper basis for construing the term to implement his
reasonable expectations.
The adhesion contracts doctrine, given present trends, is limited
in application to form contracts between unequal parties, with the su-
perior party frequently being some kind of public service enterprise.20'
The full scope of the doctrine is yet to be defined. How much
bargaining is necessary to insulate the contract from judicial scrutiny
is not yet clear. What degree of standardization in the contract is
necessary before it becomes a contract of adhesion is also unclear.
A question remains whether and to what degree the superior party
must be a public service enterprise.
Nonetheless, it does seem probable that courts will only utilize
the doctrine to analyze problems stemming from a lack of specific
knowledge by the adhering party This is implicit in the requirement
that there be some ambiguity in the terms of the contract in order
for the reasonable-expectations standard to be operative. The two
leading cases, Gray and Steven, have left open the question of whether
ambiguity is a threshold requirement or somehow interwoven in the
reasonable expectations. But it is clear that the approach focuses
Title Corp., 264 Cal. App. 2d 153, 70 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1968) (voiding a clause of
exculpation for the escrow company's negligence); and an orientation handbook given to
a teacher as an employment contract, Hamilton v. Stockton Unified School District, 245
Cal. App. 2d 944, 54 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1966) (enforcing the teacher's reasonable expec-
tations, based on the handbook, of continued employment dunng good behavior). See
also La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 849 (1971) (invalidating certain acceleration clauses found in loan contracts).
"Controversies involving widely used contracts of adhesion present ideal cases for class
adjudication " Id. at 877, 489 P.2d at 1121, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 857
200. In Walnut Creek Pipe Distributors, Inc. v. Gates Rubber Co. Sales Division,
Inc., 228 Cal. App. 2d 810, 39 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1964), the parties were bargaining
as relative equals and the manufacturer had no monopoly on the goods. The contested
clause dealt with the termination of a continuing distributor agreement, allowing a
short period of notice; both parties having the same rights under the clause. This
same result would be required under the unconscionability doctrine. UNIFORM COMMER-
ciAL CODE § 2-309(3); CAL. COMM. CODE § 2309(3) (West 1964).
201. Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 186, at 1251-53.
[Vol. 25
November 1973] CALIFORNIA UNCONSCIONABILITY STATUTE 37
on the adhering party's lack of knowledge of the terms. Subsequent
court of appeal cases have emphasized this same element.
Ambiguity cannot be said to be the typical situation in contracts,
even between parties of unequal bargaining strength. Thus, the Cali-
fornia version of an adhesion-contracts doQtrine does not reach the
typical sale of goods contract. Nor does the adhesion contracts doe-
trine clarify the proper limits of the use of bargaining superiority.
If one knows what he is getting into, then the developing doctrine
would provide very little basis for him to complain about the oppres-
siveness of the terms he accepted. This is true regardless of how
unreasonably harsh the terms might be and how much a consumer
needed the goods offered.
Specific Statutory Remedies for Consumers
The rules relating to fraud, duress, undue influence, adhesion
contracts, and interpretation of contracts apply generally to any sales
transaction. The Consumers Legal Remedies Act,2" 2 the Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act,203 and the Unruh Act2"" apply only to goods
(and, in the case of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, services)
obtained primarily for personal or household purposes. 0 5 These stat-
utes impose substantial limitations on the liberty of sellers to contract
with consumers. The legislative approach is one of listing specific
proscribed conduct200 and delineating some mandatory disclosures in
credit sales20 7 rather than the establishment of a general standard of
conduct that may be applied by courts in assessing particular consumer
transactions.
The Consumers Legal Remedies Act, in section 1770,208 deline-
ates in sixteen subdivisions specific conduct that is declared to be un-
lawful, unfair, and deceptive when undertaken by any person in a
consumer transaction. If any consumer suffers damage as a result
of such unlawful conduct, he may seek actual damages, injunctive
relief, punitive damages, and "any other relief which the court deems
proper." 20 9  Class actions are also specifically authorized if certain
202. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750-84 (West 1973).
203. Id. §§ 1790-95.5.
204. Id. §§ 1801-12.10.
205. Id. §§ 1761, 1791, 1802.1, 1802.2.
206. Id. § 1770.
207. Id. § 1803.3.
208. Id. § 1770.
209. Id. § 1780(a)(1)-(4).
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conditions are met.2 10 This "grocery list" of proscribed conduct is
a much needed attempt to spell out specific situations which may fall
short of actual fraud, but which nevertheless result in abuse of superior
bargaining power. However, one main defect in the Consumers Legal
Remedies Act lies in the attempt to create an exhaustive list of unfair
and deceptive practices for which relief must be sought under the act.
The stated goal of the act is to protect consumers against unfair
and deceptive practices generally 211 Nevertheless, the language of
section 1770212 makes it clear that only certan listed practices are
declared unlawful. Courts are thus not free to develop an adequate
standard of fairness that may be applied to all fact situations; the
judicial function is limited to interpreting the scope of the specific
prohibitions. This restrictive approach necessarily leaves many serious
cases of abuse untouched. It is simply impossible to categorize in
advance all cases of deception and other unfair practices. The act
also overemphasizes specific conduct of the seller without allowing
an adequate judicial examination of the overall effect of the transaction
on the consumer. It is this overall effect that is really significant,
and in many cases of abuse no specific conduct can be singled out
and labeled unlawful. The act is an important legislative recognition
that consumers deserve protection against unfair and deceptive prac-
tices, but further efforts are needed to develop a more comprehensive
standard of fairness by which courts may evaluate consumer trans-
actions which do not fit the exclusive list of section 1770.
Another piece of consumer legislation, the Song-Beverly Con-
sumer Warrany Act,213 defines basic rights and obligations under war-
ranties arising out of the sale of consumer goods. The predominant
effect of the act is to impose obligations on a manufacturer of goods
sold in California by a retail seller. In the absence of a disclaimer,
an implied warranty of merchantability to the effect that the goods
are fit for the ordinary purposes for which they are used attaches
by law to every retail sale of consumer goods.21 4 This warranty is
normally binding on the manufacturer,215 but t may be disclaimed
210. Id. §§ 1781, 1782(c).
211. "Tus title shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying
purposes, which are to protect consumers against unfair and deceptive business practices
and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection." Id.
§ 1760.
212. Id. § 1770.
213. Id. §§ 1790-95.5.
214. Id. §§ 1791.1, 1792.
215. Id. § 1792.
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by a conspicuous writing indicating that the goods are sold as is and
that the buyer accepts the entire risk as to quality and possible neces-
sity for repair.216  An express warranty under the act 217 refers to a
written statement arising out of a consumer sale pursuant to which
the manufacturer, distributor, or retailer agrees to repair or replace
the product or give a refund if the product proves defective. If such
an express warranty is made, then the act requires that the manufac-
turer maintain repair facilities in California.218 If he fails to provide
such facilities, the consumer is entitled by law to return the defective
product to the original retail seller for repair, replacement, or re-
fund. 219 In the alternative, the consumer may return the product to
any retail seller of like products made by the same manufacturer and
receive repair or replacement. 220  The retail seller has a claim against
the manufacturer to the extent he has been damaged by his compliance
with the statutes.221
The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act has numerous other
provisions, some of which relate to used goods222 and to persons other
than manufacturers who make express warranties to repair or replace
goods sold.223
It should be noted here that the Uniform Commercial Code pro-
visions on warranties2 24 also apply to consumer sales to the extent
that these rules do not diminish the rights of consumers under the
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.225  The Uniform Commercial
Code provisions are more applicable against retail sellers because the
act primarily covers manufacturers' obligations. Thus, the implied
warranty of merchantability attaches under the Uniform Commercial
Code to goods sold by a retailer who is a merchant with respect to
goods of that kind.228 This warranty attaches to new and used
goods, 2  but may be disclaimed by any oral or written expression
to the effect that the goods are sold as is.2 28  Under the Uniform
216. Id. § 1792.3-.5.
217. Id. § 1791.2.
218. Id. § 1793.2.
219. Id. § 1793.3(a).
220. Id. § 1793.3(b).
221. Id. § 1793.5.
222. Id. § 1795.5.
223. Id. § 1795.
224. CAL. Comm. CODE §§ 2313-17 (West 1964).
225. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1790.3 (West 1973).
226. CAL. Comm. CODE § 2314 (West 1964).
227. See id. § 2105.
228. Id. §§ 2316(2), (3)(a).
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Commercial Code, an express warranty means primarily any affirma-
tion of fact or any promise which relates to the goods and becomes
a "basis of the bargain." 2 29
These provisions help minimize abuse due to superior bar-
gaining power. Yet there exist several gaps in this statutory scheme
which need to be filled by legislative and judicial efforts. Section
1794.4 of the Civil Code provides that the Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act does not prevent the sale of a service contract to the
buyer in lieu of an express warranty 230 The terms of such a contract
are not regulated by the provisions of the act. It is possible that
by means of such a device, unreasonably harsh terms could be nposed
on a consumer who purchases a product which then proves to be
defective. A seller could disclaim all warranties but then include in
the sale for nominal consideration a service contract providing very
minimal relief. The buyer would probably not be aware of the signifi-
cance of this maneuver and would suffer considerable loss if the prod-
uct then failed.
The manufacturer is also allowed to suggest his own methods
of effecting service and repair pursuant to express warranties other
than those methods prescribed by the Act.23' By means of this
practice a consumer could also suffer serious abuse. It is doubtful
that many consumers know about the remedies afforded by the Song-
Bevery Consumer Warranty Act. Because of this general ignorance,
manufacturers' suggestions would appear to a buyer on equal footing
with the statutorily mandated information regarding repair facilities.2"2
This could result in consumers paying much more for repairs or service
than is necessary For example, a consumer might purchase a home
appliance on the basis of an advertised two-year warranty against all
malfunctions. The manufacturer making an express warranty must
list on the warranty card the addresses of local repair facilities.23 3 Nev-
ertheless, the card could be worded in such a way as to make the
consumer believe that to receive repair or service he must pay shipping
expenses to send the appliance to facilities in some other state. Thus,
229 Id. § 2313.
230. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1794.4 (West 1973).
231. "The provisions of this chapter shall not preclude a manufacturer making
express warranties from suggesting methods of effecting service and repair, m accord-
ance with the terms and conditions of the express warranties, other than those reqmred
by this chapter." Id. § 1794.5.
232. Id. § 1793.1.
223. Id.
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the manufacturer may discourage buyers from taking advantage of
express warranties or cause them to rncur added costs. Once a con-
sumer followed the seller's suggestions he would have no remedy
if he later discovered that he had been given misleading information.
A last example relating to gaps in warranty law concerns cases
where all warranties are disclaimed by stating that the goods are sold as
is. Even though the statutes require either a "conspicuous writing" 2 4
or "language winch in common understanding calls the buyer's atten-
tion to the exclusion of warranties, ' '211 in most as is sales the consumer
is not really aware of the significance of this language.2 6 The seller
may have a sales receipt or installment contract with the disclaimers
printed somewhere among other legalistic language. But it is impor-
tant to recall that, relative to the consumer, the seller has vastly superior
ability to manipulate a sales transaction. It is highly improbable,
therefore, that the consumer's attention will be directed to the lack
of any normally expected guarantees of minimal product performance.
In State Finance Co. v. Smith,2 7 the buyer was sold a worthless
used truck for $300.00. There was no finding of any nisrepresenta-
tions of fact which are the normal basis for fraud. 28   Such a sale,
if accompanied by any expression indicating that the truck were sold
as is, would not be denied enforcement under warranty law. In this
case the court found fraud based on gross inadequacy of consideration.
However, this is the only case so holding in a consumer setting. It
is weak authority for the proposition that there is now an adequate
standard by which courts may correct abuse in situations where worth-
less goods are sold as is.
Finally, the Unruh Act289 applies to retail installment sales of
consumer goods. The primary goal of the act is to require disclosure
of basic terms in consumer credit transactions and to set limits on the
interest rates that may be charged.240  The act also establishes restric-
tions on a seller's liberty to contract for delinquency charges on late
payments,241 waivers by the buyer of his rights against an assignee, 42
234. Id. § 1792.4(a).
235. CAL. Comm. CODE § 2316(3)(a) (West 1964).
236. See text accompanying notes 249-50 infra.
237. 44 Cal. App. 2d 688, 112 P.2d 901 (1941).
238. See text accompanying notes 173-179 supra.
239. CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 1801-12.10 (West 1973).
240. See, e.g., CAL. CIM. CODE §§ 1803.3, 1805.1 (West 1973).
241. Id. § 1803.6.
242. Id. § 1804.1(a).
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liens on goods not sold by the seller, 243 and deficiency judgments.2 44
The underlying purpose of the act is to require all sellers m Cali-
fornia to disclose the method used m computing finance charges so
that consumers may see how much a credit purchase actually costs
and may compare this total cost with offers from other sellers. 4 5
This truth-m-lending model of consumer behavior rests on assump-
tions that buyers will compare different offers once they are aware
of the credit terms and that disclosures of terms will actually be under-
stood by consumers. However, experience shows that comparative
shopping is rarely done.246 Furthermore, many studies have indicated
that disclosure of credit terms does not give the consumer much help
in shopping effectively 24 Even if the truth-m-lending model of con-
sumer behavior were valid, "[it is almost always inapplicable to the
purchases of the poor."248
The Unruh Act establishes certain minimal requirements with
which creditors must comply and provides penalties for violations.2 4 9
But section 1804.450 states that a contract term which violates the
act shall be void but shall not otherwise affect the validity of the con-
tract. The effect of this provision and of the limited validity of the
truth-m-lending model of consumer behavior is to leave buyers without
an adequate remedy in many cases characterized by abuse. As with
as is sales, a seller may still impose harsh and unreasonable terms
in specific cases even though he has complied with the disclosure re-
quirements. The Unruh Act serves as adequate legislation to establish
certain minimal decencies2 51 which are required in all credit transac-
tions, but such an approach leaves untouched many instances of abuse
winch do not fall within the general prohibitions.
This discussion of the California law limiting the liberty of sellers
to contract with consumers is intended to demonstrate that existing
statutes have serious gaps. These gaps need to be filled by a standard
which courts may apply on a case-by-case basis to remedy abuses
243. Id. § 1804.3.
244. Id. § 1812.5.
245. See M. BENEFIELD, NEW APPROACHES IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 88 (1970).
246. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
247 Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745, 747-54 (I967).
248. Id. at 749. See Knpke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform
44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1, 2-7 (1969); McLean, The Federal Consumer Credit Protection
Act, 24 Bus. LAW. 199 (1968).
249 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1812.6-.9 (West 1973).
250. Id. § 1804.4.
251. See Liewellyn, supra note 38 at 703.
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which are not covered by statute. Generally the approach of the con-
sumer-onented statutes is to list specific proscribed conduct and re-
quired disclosures while still maintaining substantial freedom of con-
tract for the seller. This approach results in helping to mininnize such
gross departures from fair business conduct as blatantly deceptive
advertising, failure to perform warranty agreements, and undisclosed
high rates of credit. The statutes do nothing to alter the basic fact
of inequality of bargaining power and the consequent potential for
abuse. Because it is impossible to list all the specific types of abuse
that may result from this inequality, there will necessarily be cases
which fall outside the statutory prohibitions but which nevertheless
warrant relief for the consumer. What is needed to plug the gaps
in existing law is the adoption of the standard of unconscionability.
Application of the Standard of Unconscionability:
The Test for Abuse
The consumer market is characterized by inequality of bargain-
ing position between seller and buyer.252  The consumer is generally
in a weaker position because he lacks knowledge of the subject mat-
ter of the sale25" and sufficient resources to enable him to bargain
effectively.254 Harsh terms are sometimes imposed on a buyer without
his awareness of such terms.255 The consumer often accepts unfair
terms even if he is aware of the harsh consequences of the transaction
because he needs what the stronger party offers or because the mono-
polistic market has made fair terms impossible to find.25 The seller's
position of superior bargaining power in a monopolistic market gives
him the ability to dictate the terms of the sale transaction. This ability
is limited only by a body of law based on the premise that there should
be the utmost liberty to make agreements which will be enforceable
by the courts.25 ' That body of law imposes limitations on freedom of
contract, but these are not sufficient to protect the public interest in
achieving a fair exchange of goods and services.
What is needed to help achieve this fair exchange is a standard
that may be applied to consumer transactions on a case-by-case basis
to detect abuses due to superior bargaining power which are not cov-
252. See text accompanying notes 36-54 supra.
253. See text accompanying notes 37-44 supra.
254. See text accompanying notes 45-50 supra.
255. Mellinkoff, How to Make Contracts Illegible, 5 STAN. L. REv. 418 (i953).
256. See note 59 supra.
257. See text accompanying notes 56-63 supra.
ered by existing law The standard developed here is based on the
Uniform Commercial Code doctrine of unconscionability 258 This
doctrine, originally embraced by section 2-302 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code has been expanded into section 5108 of the proposed
legislation.259 Unconscionability will serve as a tool sufficiently sensi-
tive to detect those cases of abuse which warrant judicial relief. By
listing m nine subdivisions practices which evidence an unconscionable
contract, section 5108 serves as a much-needed collecting place for
doctrines relevant to consumer transactions. This approach, coupled
with the provision for attorney's fees,2 60 facilitates legitimate consumer
actions which are now discouraged because of the ambiguity of exist-
ing law and the high cost of bringing such actions. The adoption
of section 5108 would save attorneys much time in consumer cases
and would especially benefit legal assistance programs oriented toward
poor consumers. At the same time, this collection of rules aids busi-
nessmen in predicting judicial responses to their standard form con-
tracts and sales practices.2 61 By spelling out factors relevant to uncon-
258. See text of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 contained in note 3 supra.
259. S.B. 3, supra note 5. See text of S.B. 3, § 5108, contained in note 6 supra.
260. S.B. 3, § 5108(d), contained in note 6 supra.
261. Specific guidelines for contract draftsmen who want to avoid problems of
unconscionability are found in F HART & W WILLIER, 5 BENDrR'S UCC SERVICE FORMS
& PROCEDURES 21.03, at 2-13 to 2-14, which states:
"A few suggestions may be made to the draftsman in connection with Section
2-302:
(1) Since the section permits the introduction of evidence which supports the rea-
sonableness of a questionable clause, such evidence should be preserved. In many
cases it may be wise to include a 'Whereas clause' or the like m provisions that appear
harsh.
(2) Restraint should be practiced where the draftsman is prompted to include
clauses that are not necessary to protect his client but only used to afford rights in
rare situations not likely to occur. Often provisions of the Code give substantial protec-
tion without any help from the agreement. Where advisable to include rights
or remedies in the contract, the impulse to draft these to the exclusive advantage of
one party should be curbed.
(3) Where the attorney is representing a client with clearly superior bargaining
power, and a contract of adhesion is in the making, special care should be exerted to
give the other party rights reasonable to the transaction.
(4) The inclusion of provisions favorable to the other party may of itself, have
some effect on a court's determination under this section. If, however, the rights
given are hollow, an acute judge may well, and should perceive an attempt to avoid
unconscionability by form rather than substance.
(5) There are certain areas of drafting where the doctrine of unconscionability
is likely to be invoked. (a) disclaimers and modifications of warranties; (b) modi-
fications of remedies (c) restrictions upon dealing with third parties; and (d)
liquidated damages clauses " (footnotes omitted). This illustrates the extent to
which standards of unconscionability have been particularized, such that avoidance of
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scionability, section 5108 helps honest sellers to avoid any unconscion-
able results and thereby to advance the goal of fair exchange of goods
and services.
Tins article proposes the following test for determining when the
court should void as unconscionable a contract or certain terms
thereof: the court should consider the factors enumerated in section
5108 (c) (1_9)261 in order to ascertain whether unequal bargaining
power has been utilized to produce contract terms or sales practices
which bear no reasonable relation to the business risks assumed by
the superior party nor to the benefits he provides to the weaker party.
Two cases arising out of non-consumer settings will serve to introduce
the discussion of the proposed standard of unconscionability. This
standard is necessary to modify the mapact of the doctrine of freedom
of contract and to serve as an important "residual category" 6 ' which
allows courts to remedy abuse in cases which defy statutory classifica-
tion.
One case that fully develops the standard for evaluating uncon-
scionable behavior in a nonconsumer setting is In re Elkins-Dell Manu-
facturing Co.,214 wherein a creditor required terms26 5 in a loan con-
tract which were too harsh on the bankrupt and too favorable to the
creditor. The cause was remanded to a bankruptcy referee with in-
structions to determine whether the risks assumed by the creditor were
valued at too high a price.266 Unconscionability, reasoned the court,
is not shown merely by proof that the terms are harsh on one party.
2 6 7
Rather, the issue turns on whether the terms of the agreement bear
a reasonable relation to the business risks undertaken in the perform-
ance of contractual obligations by the superior bargaining party.268
unfair surprise and oppression is entirely possible if contract draftsmen will make
a good faith attempt to comply with the requirements of the doctrine.
262. See text of S.B. 3, § 5108, contained in note 6 supra.
263. For a discussion of the vital functions in the law of such "residual categor-
ies," see Ellinghaus, supra note 3, at 759.
264. 253 F Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966), vacating 2 UCC RaP. SERv. 1021 (E.D.
Pa. 1965).
265. The contract obligated the borrower to finance only through the creditor,
Fidelity, but the latter could refuse to supply funds; Fidelity reserved power to direct
the United States Post Office to deliver the debtor's mail to the creditor; the borrower
had to obtain permission to go into bankruptcy; and Fidelity had unilateral power
to change the contract's terms and the borrower could object only within five days of
receiving notice of the change. Id. at 866.
266. Id. at 874.
267. Id. at 871-73, 875.
268. This test of unconscionable oppression has been adopted by the recently
promulgated Uniform Consumer Credit Code, whereas the credit worthiness of a partic-
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Thus, a high price or an extremely one-sided security arrangement
in a loan situation may not be oppressive in view of the surrounding
circumstances; it will be unconscionable only if it bears no relation
to a reasonable allocation of risks in the transaction.
Application of this standard requires a two-step analysis. First,
the court must examine the costs to the stronger party of the risks
which he agreed to assume. Evidence of profit margins and other
statistics relating to the business experience of the superior party are
relevant to the estimate of these costs. Second, the court must deter-
mine whether the price demanded accurately and fairly reflects these
risks and the benefits conferred. The latter requires a determination
of the fair market value26 9 of the goods or services made available
to the weaker party 270 The element of market value is not difficult
to assess. It would beg the question to say that market value means
what the two parties in the particular bargain decided. The proper
test should be what the goods or services "would sell for in a hypo-
thetical 'normal' market, in which other parties might have made bids,
had not the buyer or seller been prevented by ignorance or pressing
necessity from seeking them out." '' Where the particular market in-
volved is not completely monopolistic, an adequate test for market
value is the price at which similar goods and services are readily obtain-
able by other consumers in the general geographic area.272
In re Elkins-Dell is the only case wherein the above analysis of
unconscionability is explicitly stated. However, the same process
ular consumer and the reasonableness of business risks in extending credit to him are
measured by the price that would be charged for a given item in a sale to persons
in similar economic situations throughout a given area. See UNIFORM CONSUMER
CREDrr CODE 5.108, comment 2; Shanker & Abel, Consumer Protection Under Article
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 689, 706, 707 (1968).
269. Reliance on the fair market value standard emphasizes that the unconscion-
ability doctrine can be seen as a design to make the competitive mechamsm work
fairly, rather than to hinder its operation.
270. It might be argued that, as under the Uniform Commercial Code section
2-302, note 3 supra, a third step is then necessary- a comparison of the contract
terms demanded by the stronger party with contracts used in the trade. The Uniform
Commercial Code defines a usage of trade as: "any practice or method of dealing
having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an
expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question
UrIoRM COMMERCiAL CODE § 1-205.
However, if it is customary to demand so much that it appears oppressive in
light of the low risks assumed, then the trade custom should be found to be an
unconscionable standard.
271. Hale, supra note 58, at 624.
272. See S.B. 3, § 5108(c) (3), contained in note 6 supra.
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is implicit in several other Uniform Commercial Code section 2-302
cases273 and is an appropriate test for evaluating consumer transac-
tions.
The California case of La Sala v. American Savings and Loan
Association,27 4 decided without the benefit of section 2-302, illustrates
the same type of judicial evaluation of the relation between the terms
of a loan contract and the risks assumed by the creditor. Two of
the named plaintiffs in this class action against American had bor-
rowed sums of about $10,000 and $20,000 respectively,2 75 secured
by encumbrances on certain property. The debtors later executed
second trust deeds on the secured property. American then sent them
notices to the effect that an acceleration provision in the loan contract
gave to American the right to demand immediate payment of the out-
standing balance if the debtor should execute a jumor encumbrance
on the secured property. (The court labelled this a due-on-encum-
brance clause as opposed to a due-on-sale clause which would require
immediate acceleration if the debtor sold the secured property.)276
However, American offered to waive this right to acceleration if the
borrower of the $10,000 would agree to a payment of $50 and an
increase from 6.6 to 8.75 percent interest on the balance of the loan.
The terms offered to the other debtor were $150 and an increase
from 6 to 9 percent. After receipt of this notice, plaintiffs brought
suit on the grounds that the acceleration clause constituted an invalid
restraint upon alienation. The supreme court held:
[Ihe lender may insist upon'the automatic performance of the due-
on-sale clause because such a provision is necessary to the lender's
security. We have decided, however, that the power lodged in the
lender by the due-on-encumbrance clause can claim no such me-
chamcal justification. We sustain it only in the case of a trial
court's finding that it is reasonably necessary to the protection of
the lender's security; to repose an absolute power in the creditor
to enforce the clause under any and all circumstances could lead
to an abusive application of it and in some cases an arbitrary exac-
tion of a quid pro quo from debtors.277
Certain language in the holding of the case lends support to the
proposed standard of unconscionability. The trial court is authorized
to determine whether the acceleration clause is "reasonably necessary
273. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
274. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
275. Id. at 869-70, 489 P.2d at 1115-16, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 851-52.
276. Id. at 869, 489 P.2d at 1115, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
277. Id. at 884, 489 P.2d at 1126, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
to the protection of the lender's security ",278 It is implicitly
recognized that the creditor is of such superior bargaining power that
the enforcement of the clause simply because the debtor signed a writ-
ten contract could lead to an abusive "exaction of a quid pro quo. 2 1
This type of judicial reasoning should be recognized as applicable to
all consumer transactions that manifest inequality of bargaining posi-
tion and a resulting lack of reasonable relation between the contract
terms and the risks assumed by the seller in the performance of his
obligations.
The concept encompassed by the phrase freedom of contract is
based on certain assumptions about the behavior of contracting parties.
The concept posits that both parties are more or less equal in knowl-
edge and power"' and that it is therefore appropriate to enforce a
contract between such parties when there exist certain objective mam-
festations of consent. In most situations in the modem consumer
goods market, however, these are false assumptions and the model
thus cannot operate well as mechanism for fairly allocating benefits
and risks on the basis of mutual understanding. To the same extent,
the doctrine supposedly based on freedom is actually a way for the
knowing and the powerful to get far more for what they give than
it is reasonably worth. The standard of unconscionability serves to
detect and compensate for the "factors which disturb and disrupt the
'market' "281 and to help assure that the underlying basis upon which the
concept of freedom of contract is founded does, in fact, exist before the
law recognizes a contract as binding on both parties.
The proposed standard does impose further restrictions on the
liberty of sellers to create enforceable agreements, but this standard
creates these limitations only to facilitate the goal to which freedom
of contract itself is supposed to lead. It must be remembered that
liberty to contract is not an end in itself.282 This liberty is only
a means to achieve the goal of fair and efficient distribution of goods
and services. The doctrine is a logically appropriate means to that
end only when the assumed facts of equal bargaining power and
knowledge do exist. But the doctrine and the law based upon it be-
come dysfunctional when the assumed facts do not exist. Modem law
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See Pound, supra note 59, at 454.
281. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MIcH. L. REv. 253,
281 (1947).
282. See, e.g., Pound, supra note 59, at 457
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has tended to stress this concept of freedom over the true content
of fairness. The result is that many transactions characterized by
abuse are enforced against consumers.
Unconscionability provides a workable limitation on liberty to
contract by recognizing that the modem consumer often lacks knowl-
edge about important terms of the transaction in spite of his apparent
behavior to the contrary. Implicit in the test for abuse is the idea
that consent to an unconscionable term or transaction is neither free
nor real as a matter of law. The standard of unconscionability thus
indirectly emphasizes the element of consent as necessary to a valid
contract and seeks to fulfill the statutory command that the consent
of the parties must be free, mutual and communicated by each to
the other.1 3
Contract law attempts to enforce the "reasonable [business] ex-
pectations that have been induced by the making of a promise' 284
and by the givmg of apparent consent. But if consent is induced
by abuse of bargaining power and results in an unconscionable transac-
tion, the expectations of the superior party should not be enforced.
In applying the standard of unconscionability, the court should strive
to ascertain that conduct which is acceptable behavior on the part
of a merchant toward a consumer, and not that wich might be appro-
priate between knowledgeable merchants. 285 This is a necessary per-
spective from which to judge the relation of the contract terms or
sales practices to the risks assumed by the seller. In determining
whether the seller's conduct is acceptable, the court should determine
what the consumer could reasonably expect according to the seller's
calling and to what extent these expectations were disappointed.28
This concept adequately takes into account the public aspects of con-
sumer problems by recognizing that, to a degree, any retail merchant
is like a public service enterprise:
[W]e have established that the duties of public service companies
are not contractual, as the nineteenth century sought to make them,
but are instead relational; they do not flow from agreements which
the public servant may make as he chooses, they flow from the
the calling in which he has engaged and hIs consequent relation
to the public. 287
283. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1565 (West 1954).
284. A. CoRBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRAcTs § 1, at 2 (One Volume Ed. 1952).
285. UNIFORM CONSUMER CRnDrr CODE § 5.108, Comment 1.
286. Kessler, supra note 58 at 637.
287. R. POUND, SPRT OF THE COMMON LAW 29 (1921). The quote refers to
insurance companies and the purely judicial development whereby courts have taken
the law of insurance out of the category of contract.
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Notwithstanding the general rule of liberty to contract, it is in the
public interest to allow courts to employ an explicit standard of uncon-
scionability to remedy abuses in consumer transactions. The courts,
of course, will not be able to alter the distribution of power in the
market, but they should be able to discourage any unfair advantage
gamed over consumers because of an unequal allocation of power.
Conclusion
The Uniform Commercial Code does not give a detailed definition
of unconscionability It simply states that "[t]he principle is one of
prevention of oppression and unfair surprse."'28a Much of the con-
troversy over section 2-302289 centers around the alleged vagueness
of the concept.2 90 The Uniform Commercial Code has been criticized
on the ground that the drafters failed to adequately define unconscion-
ability 291 The section has been labeled merely "an emotionally satis-
fying incantation" which fails to establish meaningful guidelines for
the courts.292
This criticism on the ground of vagueness is based on a notion
that unconscionability can and should be defined in a precise manner.
It may be said that the official comments gave rise to this notion
through the attempt to define unconscionability simply in terms of
oppression, unfair surprise, and one-sideness.293 However, this ap-
proach stressing precise definitions should be discarded. Accusations
of vagueness and attempts at mechanical definitions are simply not
relevant to the real functions of the standard of unconscionability In
a recent article, M.P Ellinghaus correctly contends that this standard
optimally serves as a residual category294 which allows courts to eval-
uate transactions which defy regulation by narrowly drawn statutes,
but which may nevertheless warrant judicial scrutiny
The maintenance of such residual categores-"reasonableness,"
"due care," and "good faith" are obvious if maximally dissunilar
examples-is essential to the well-being of any system, and serves
to counteract its inherent tendency to become logically closed.295
Other writers have concurred in this approach to unconscionability
288. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 1.
289. See note 3 supra.
290. See note 21 supra.
291. E.g., Leff, supra note 3.
292. Id. at 558-59.
293. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 1.
294. Ellinghaus, supra note 3, at 759.
295. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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and make the point that, when viewed from this perspective, "most
of the discussion of unconscionability during the last decade becomes
totally academic."29
The real significance of the standard proposed here is to provide
courts with a test whereby consumer transactions may be assessed with
a higher probability of reaching a fair result than is possible with
existing mechanically-applied doctrines. Attempts to create rigid cate-
gories and precise definitions would defeat the essential purpose of
this standard in assessing fundamental fairness. Section 5108291 of
the proposed legislation"9 ' sets forth the rule that courts shall not enforce
unconscionable transactions, and it lists in nine subdivisions basic
factors to be considered in the development and application of a flexi-
ble test for unconscionability. The test advocated here is whether
the contract terms and sales practices bear a reasonable relation to
the risks assumed by the seller and to the benefits he confers on the
weaker party.2 9 The judiciary is urged to adopt this test and to con-
tribute creativity and perception in making a significant development
in California law.
296. Terry & Fauvre, The Unconscionability Offense, 4 GA. L. REv. 469, 491
(1970).
297. S.B. 3, § 5108, contained in note 6 supra.
298. S.B. 3, supra note 5.
299. See text accompanying notes 252-281 supra.

